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CITIZENS OF AN ENEMY LAND: ENEMY 
COMBATANTS, ALIENS, AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS OF THE PSEUDO-CITIZEN 
Juliet Stumpf*
Does citizenship as we know it still exist in the post-September 11 
world?  Do the exigencies of war require a more cautious approach in deciding 
who among the citizenry is legitimately a citizen?  The Supreme Court has 
granted certioriari in two cases that resolve these questions in opposite ways.  
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld1 and Padilla v. Rumsfeld2 each raise constitutional 
challenges to the military’s detention of a U.S. citizen accused of taking 
actions against the U.S. government in a time of war.3  In Hamdi, the Fourth 
Circuit resolved these challenges against the U.S. citizen.4  Emphasizing 
Hamdi’s ties with foreigners and foreign lands and his tenuous connection 
with the United States, the opinion applied precedent relating to non-citizens 
to evaluate the citizen’s constitutional claims.5  In Padilla, the Second Circuit 
held the military detention unconstitutional.6  Characterizing Padilla as a 
prototypical member of the citizenry, as an “American citizen seized on 
American soil,” it declined to apply doctrines created to govern the non-
citizen.7
This article exposes the radical redefining of citizenship augured in the 
recent case law addressing citizens suspected of disloyalty.  Cases in which 
the military has detained U.S. citizens on the suspicion that they are “enemy 
combatants” have blurred the distinctions between citizens and non-citizens.  
Rules that grew out of jurisprudence about non-citizens have crept into 
decisions in which the government has questioned the legitimacy and loyalty 
of citizens.  The appearance of these rules and their implications for 
citizenship have gone virtually unnoticed by advocates and critics of the 
enemy combatant cases.  Yet the presence of these rules accompanies the 
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1 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003).
2 Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 699 (2d Cir. 2003).
3 Id. at 699; Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 470-71.
4 Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 470-71.
5 Id. at 460, 470-71, 474.
6 Padilla, 352 F.3d at 699.
7 Id. at 711-24.
2 Juliet Stumpf 9-Mar-04
courts’ sub rosa evaluation of whether the citizen is legitimately a member of 
the citizenry.  Together, they effectively create a hybrid category of 
citizenship – what I call “pseudo-citizenship ,” to which lesser constitutional 
protections against federal power apply.
This article reframes the current heated debate about these cases.  That 
debate has polarized as a conflict between the power of the federal 
government in wartime and the scope of constitutional protections for 
citizens.8 Recast as a debate about the very substance of citizenship, radically 
different questions arise.  Is there room in our constitutional framework for a 
new category of citizenship that draws from constitutional norms governing 
non-citizens?  Should the courts make room for a jurisprudence of pseudo-
citizenship in a world in which traditional notions of war and conflict no 
longer seem to apply?
INTRODUCTION
On May 8, 2002, upon landing at Chicago’s O’Hare International 
Airport, José Padilla was arrested in connection with a grand jury investigation 
into the September 11 attacks.9  Padilla is a U.S. citizen, born in Brooklyn, 
New York.10  He grew up in Brooklyn and Chicago and moved to Florida as a 
young adult.11 Family friends and others remember him as a handsome, quiet 
boy who played basketball in the street and was close to his mother.12  As a 
teen and later an adult, he apparently joined a gang13 and acquired a criminal 
record that included a juvenile conviction for murder and later a weapons 
charge.14 He converted from Roman Catholicism to Islam at some point along 
the way.15 According to the Department of Defense, in 1998, Padilla moved 
to Egypt,16 changed his name to Abdullah al Muhajir,17 and traveled to 
8 See, e.g., George C. Harris, Terrorism and the Constitution: Sacrificing Civil Liberties in the Name of 
National Security, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 135, 147-49 (Spring 2003); William Rehnquist, Civil Liberty and the Civil 
War: The Indianapolis Treason Trials, 72 IND. L.J. 927, 932 (1997); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, 
Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During 
Wartime, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1, 1-2, 9, 15-20 (January 2004); Carl Tobias, Detentions, Military 
Commissions, Terrorism, And Domestic Case Precedent, 76 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1371 (Sept. 2003); David Cole, Their 
Liberties, Our Security: Democracy and Double Standards, 31 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 290, 291 (Summer 2003).
9 Padilla, 352 F.3d at 699, 700.
10 Id.; Lucio Guerrero et al., 'A Couple of Years Back, I Knew He Entered a Cult', CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 11, 
2002, at 6.
11 James Risen & Philip Shenon, Traces of Terror: The Investigation; U.S. Says It Halted Qaeda Plot to Use 
Radioactive Bomb, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2002, at A1; Cam Simpson, FBI Hunts Padilla 'Partner'; Worldwide Alert 
Issued for Saudi, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 21, 2003, at C1.
12
 Guerrero et al., supra note __; Richard A. Serrano, U.S. Breaks Old Legal Ground; Precedents of WWII Are 
Cited in Jailing of Alleged 'Dirtybomber' Since May Without Charges, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2002, at 1.
13
 Manuel Roig-Franzia & Amy Goldstein, A Bomb Suspect's Search for Identity; In Padilla's Metamorphosis 
Into Al Muhajir, Fla. Provided a Turning Point, WASH. POST, June 15, 2002, at A1.
14 Padilla, 352 F.3d at 700.
15
 Jonathan Weisman, et al., American Terror Suspect Is Not Unique, USA TODAY, June 11, 2002, at _A3; 
Risen & Shenon, supra note __.
16 Padilla, 352 F.3d at 700.
17 Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 572 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing the declaration of Michael H. Mobbs, a 
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countries in the Middle East and Southwest Asia in 1999 and 2000.18
Allegedly, he met with senior al Queda officials and discussed plans to 
detonate a radioactive bomb in the United States.19
After his arrest, Padilla was held as a civilian material witness20 in the 
Metropolitan Correctional Center in New York.21 In June 2002, when 
Padilla’s counsel moved to vacate the material witness warrant, President 
Bush declared that Padilla was an “enemy combatant” and ordered the 
Secretary of Defense to take custody of him.22  The Department of Defense 
transferred him to a naval brig in South Carolina and has detained him there 
since, incommunicado and, until recently,23 without access to counsel.24
In the fall of 2001, the Northern Alliance25 captured Yaser Esam 
Hamdi in Afghanistan and turned him over to the United States military along 
with other prisoners.26  When the U.S. military discovered that Hamdi was a 
U.S. citizen, they transferred him from a detention camp in Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba to the Norfolk Naval Station Brig in Virginia.27
Unlike Padilla, Hamdi did not grow up in the United States.  He was 
born in Baton Rouge, Louisiana but his family left the United States for Saudi 
Arabia when he was a young child.28  In contrast to the searching media 
inquiry into Padilla’s U.S. childhood,29 neither the media nor the courts have 
shed much light on Hamdi’s background.  According to the petition his father 
filed on his behalf, Hamdi was residing in Afghanistan when Northern 
Alliance forces detained him.30  The Department of Defense alleges that he 
served with the Taliban and had an assault rifle when he was captured.31  Like 
special advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (hereinafter “Mobbs Declaration”)).  Mobbs claimed to 
have no direct knowledge of Padilla’s actions or of the interrogations that produced the information in the 
declaration.  Padilla, 352 F.3d at 700.  
18 Padilla, 352 F.3d at 700-01 (citing the Mobbs Declaration).
19 Id. at 701; see also Risen & Shenon, supra note __.
20
 The government may detain as a material witness an individual who has unique information about a crime 
and when necessary to ensure the person’s appearance and testimony at relevant court proceedings.  18 U.S.C. § 
3144 (2000); see Stacey M. Studnicki & John P. Apol, Witness Detention and Intimidation: The History and Future 
of Material Witness Law, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 483, 485 (Summer 2002).
21 Padilla, 352 F.3d at 700.
22 Id.
23 Neil A. Lewis, Supreme Court Will Hear 3rd Detainee Case, N.Y. TIMES, February 21, 2004, at A9 
(reporting that government officials had granted Padilla and Hamdi access to counsel while maintaining that they 
were under no legal obligation to do so).
24 Padilla, 352 F.3d at 700.
25
 The Northern Alliance is a coalition of military groups opposed to the Taliban.  Michael R. Gordon & Eric 
Schmitt, A Nation Challenged: The Strategy; U.S. Seeks Afghan Coalition Against Taliban, N.Y. TIMES, September 
24, 2001, at A1.
26 Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 460.  Hamdi has generated three appellate panel opinions, the last two of which are 
relevant to this article.  See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 294 F.3d 598 (4th Cir. 2002) (“Hamdi I”); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 
F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2002) (“Hamdi II”); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (“Hamdi III”), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 981 
(2004).
27 Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 460.
28 Id.
29 See e.g., supra, notes 10-13, 15. 
30 Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 460. 
31 Id. at 461.
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Padilla, President Bush has classified Hamdi as an “enemy combatant.”32
Like Padilla, the Department of Defense has detained Hamdi in a military brig 
incommunicado and, until recently, without access to legal counsel.33  The 
United States has brought no charges against either detainee.34
On January 8, 2003, the Fourth Circuit upheld the military’s detention 
of Hamdi, ruling that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments did not require the 
government to provide him a criminal trial.35  Portraying him as a foreigner 
who “may not have renounced his American citizenship,”36 the opinion 
described Hamdi’s U.S. citizenship as accidentally obtained and characterized 
his connection with the U.S. community as minimal at best.37  Consistent with 
that portrayal, the opinion relied upon rules that govern the scope of 
constitutional protections for non-citizens.38  It applied the plenary power 
doctrine, which calls for extraordinary judicial deference to the executive and 
legislative branches and diminished constitutional protections when those 
branches act in the spheres of immigration, national security, or foreign 
policy.39  The plenary power doctrine was created in part to govern those 
deemed outside the social contract embodied in the Constitution, such as non-
citizens.40 Hamdi was the first time that a court had applied the plenary power 
doctrine to a U.S. citizen in the United States alleged to be an unlawful 
combatant.
On December 18, 2003, the Second Circuit ruled that, because Padilla 
was an “American citizen” seized on “American soil,” the military could not 
constitutionally detain him and he was entitled to the constitutional protections 
of a criminal trial.41  It declined to apply to Padilla standards developed to 
govern non-citizens in indefinite detention, instead emphasizing his 
citizenship and the constitutional protections that limited the President’s 
power to detain citizens.42  It rejected the application of the plenary power 
32 Id.
33 Id. at 460-61.
34 Id. at 460; Padilla,352 F.3d at 700.
35 Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 470-71.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 460 (stating “Hamdi apparently was born in Louisiana but left for Saudi Arabia when he was a small 
child”). 
38 Id. at 474 (citing, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001)); see infra, notes 247-56 and accompanying text.
39 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) (articulating the elements of the 
plenary power doctrine).  Curtiss-Wright excluded citizens from the scope of its holding: “Neither the Constitution 
nor the laws passed in pursuance of it have any force in foreign territory unless in respect of our own citizens….”).  
Id.; see also David Cole, In Aid of Removal: Due Process Limits on Immigration Detention, 51 EMORY L.J. 1003, 
1015-26 (Summer 2002) [hereinafter “In Aid of Removal”] (describing the Supreme Court’s deference to the plenary 
power of the federal government when it creates “substantive criteria” to govern the admission and expulsion of 
aliens, and noting that plenary power is limited only by due process considerations).
40 See Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth 
Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 5 (November 2002); Natsu Taylor Saito, 
Asserting Plenary Power over the “Other”: Indians, Immigrants, Colonial Subjects, and Why U.S. Jurisprudence 
Needs to Incorporate International Law, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 427, 429-30 (2002) [hereinafter “Asserting 
Plenary Power”].
41 Padilla, 352 F.3d at 699.
42 Id. at 711-24; see also id. at 733 (Wesley, J., dissenting) (citing as precedent for the legality of Padilla’s 
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doctrine to Padilla, holding that the President had overstepped his powers in 
indefinitely detaining this citizen.43
What distinguishes these two detainees?  Both are citizens.  Both have 
been declared to be unlawful combatants.  Both are detained in military 
custody in the United States.  Yet the two cases reach opposite conclusions.  
Although the opinions seek to distinguish one another based on whether the 
seizure took place inside or outside the United States, away from a zone of 
combat,44 both citizens have been detained within the United States and within 
reach of a functioning civil court.  Can we attribute the outcomes entirely to a 
liberty-oriented Second Circuit versus a security-minded Fourth Circuit?
Assuming the government’s allegations are true, the harm to the 
United States that Padilla would cause by detonating a radioactive bomb in the 
United States is arguably greater than the harm to the United States that 
Hamdi caused fighting the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan.  Shouldn’t the 
executive branch have greater latitude to protect the country against disloyal 
citizens when the threat is within our borders?  Does the characterization of 
Hamdi as effectively a foreigner and Padilla as the archetypal U.S. citizen 
suggest a more compelling explanation for the different outcomes in these two 
opinions?  What is the significance of the reliance in Hamdi and not Padilla 
on rules traditionally applied to non-citizens and of the use of the plenary 
power doctrine?  Scholarship concerning the enemy combatant cases has 
generally overlooked the appearance of the plenary power doctrine and, 
associated with it, the reliance on rules governing non-citizens to measure the 
scope of constitutional protections for citizens.  Although many observers 
have commented on the differences in the treatment of citizens and non-
citizens alleged to be belligerents, little attention has been paid whether these 
cases actually maintain a firm line between citizenship and alienage.45
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in both Hamdi and Padilla 
and will hear the cases in the upcoming term.46  As the Court grapples with the 
tension between national security and individual rights that both Hamdi and 
Padilla raise, its decision cannot fail to affect traditional conceptions of equal 
citizenship.  In doing so, the Supreme Court is likely to consider two central 
precedents about the constitutional rights of U.S. citizens detained as enemy 
combatants, Ex Parte Milligan47 and Ex Parte Quirin.48  All four cases 
detention Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (establishing standards for detention of non-citizens)).
43 Id. at 711-24.
44 Id. at 711; Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 465.
45 Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration and We The People After September 11, 66 ALB. L. REV. 413, 422 (2003) 
(“What is really troubling about the government's response to September 11 has not been that the government is 
treating citizens and non-citizens differently.  Rather, it is that current policies treat many citizens as if they were 
non-citizens—at least if we look beyond a narrow, legalistic definition of what it means to be a U.S. citizen”); Neal 
K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 
1296 (2002) (arguing that protecting the rights of non-citizens requires linking them with the rights of citizens).
46 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 981 (2004); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, --- S. Ct. --- , 2004 WL 95802, *1 (2004).  
47
 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
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consider the habeas petitions of U.S. citizens that invoke constitutional 
protections against military detention or trial.  Like Padilla, Milligan rejected 
the government’s assertion of plenary power to assert military jurisdiction 
over citizens, holding that the citizen possesses individual constitutional rights 
that constrain the exercise of federal power.49  Like Hamdi, Quirin rejected the 
petitioner’s citizenship-based claim to constitutional protections under the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendments and relied on rules and principles from cases 
involving non-citizens.50  Elements of the plenary power doctrine appear in 
Quirin, including judicial deference to the government’s claim that it has 
inherent power to try a citizen in a military forum where individual 
constitutional rights do not apply.51
In this article, I propose that the unlawful combatant cases have erased 
the divide between citizens and non-citizens and created a hybrid category of 
citizenship.  I seek to explain why rules that govern the scope of federal power 
over non-citizens, such as the plenary power doctrine, have begun to appear in 
decisions about federal power over citizens.  I suggest that underlying the 
courts’ decisions throughout the unlawful combatant cases are determinations 
about the legitimacy of the individual petitioner’s citizenship.  The emergence 
of the plenary power doctrine in these cases reflects the application of a sub 
rosa membership test for true citizenship that evaluates whether a citizen is 
entitled to the full benefits of individual constitutional rights.52 This 
membership test not only measures the strength of the individual’s connection 
to the United States, but also evaluates the community with which the court 
associates the individual and the legitimacy of that community’s claim to 
participation in the constitutional social contract.
Whether a citizen suspected of being an “enemy combatant” is truly a 
member of the national community predetermines the ultimate decision about 
whether the citizen is entitled to the constitutional protections of a criminal 
trial rather than a military forum. Those viewed as having insufficient ties  to 
the United States community become, in effect, pseudo -citizens who receive a 
lower level of constitutional protection than full citizens.  Pseudo-citizens are 
subject to the plenary power doctrine, which permits law governing non-
citizens to apply.  This focus on the quality or nature of the individual’s 
citizenship is consistent with the use of the plenary power doctrine, which 
grew out of contexts in which citizenship was either suspect or absent.
Part I of this article describes the development of the pseudo-citizen in 
the Supreme Court case law starting with Milligan in 1866 and leading up to 
48
 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
49 Milligan, 71 U.S. at 121-22.
50 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 37-38, 44. 
51 Id. at 29-46.
52 See Linda Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447, 456-88 (2000)
[hereinafter “Citizenship”] (describing four discourses in case law regarding citizenship: formal legal status, rights, 
political activity, and identity).
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the current enemy combatant cases.  In the century after Milligan, the plenary 
power doctrine emerged through the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
concerning groups considered outside of the national membership: Asian 
immigrants and Native Americans.53  Finally, this section explores how, in 
Quirin, the petitioner’s failure to meet the citizenship test coincided with the 
Court’s early application of elements of the plenary power doctrine to citizens 
accused of being enemy combatants.  I propose that, in these cases, the 
doctrine contributed to the creation of a category of pseudo-citizens.
Part II argues that this membership test plays out in opposite ways in 
Hamdi and Padilla. It explores the application of the plenary power doctrine 
in Hamdi to citizens accused of being enemy combatants,54 and the tension in 
Padilla concerning the doctrine.55  Part III addresses the implications of a 
membership test that creates a new category of citizenship.  It discusses the 
possible outcome of the upcoming Supreme Court decisions in Hamdi and 
Padilla and confronts the larger effects on both citizens and non-citizens of 
the malleability of citizenship categories.  I observe that a hierarchy of 
citizenship in which some citizens receive greater constitutional protections 
than others upsets common understandings about equality across citizens.  A 
membership test for citizenship is likely to disproportionately impact those 
citizens who are perceived as being on the margins of citizenship.  It also 
unmoors expectations about the stability and permanency of citizenship by 
allowing the government, rather than the citizen, to control citizenship status.  
Finally, I conclude that the use of rules governing non-citizens instructs us to 
be cautious when fashioning rules for non-citizens because those rules may 
eventually be applied to citizens.
I. CITIZENSHIP, MEMBERSHIP AND THE RISE OF THE PLENARY POWER 
DOCTRINE 
In the decades between the Court’s Ex Parte Milligan and Ex Parte 
Quirin decisions, the Court laid the groundwork for a membership test to 
determine whether a citizen accused of aiding the enemy was subject to a 
military trial rather than the constitutional protection of a criminal trial.  
Throughout this period, the Court applied membership and social contract 
principles, which focus on “the consent of a particular population to be 
governed”56 and identify who is entitled by that consent to the protections of 
the Constitution.57
53 See Cleveland, supra note __, at 7; Saito, Asserting Plenary Power, supra note __, at 429.  
54 Hamdi II, 296 F.3d at 281; Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 474.  
55 Padilla, 352 F.3d at 713-14; see also id. at 726 (Wesley, J., dissenting).  
56
 Cleveland, supra note __, at 20.
57
 Scholars of immigration jurisprudence have explored the tension between social contract/membership theory 
and a more inclusive view of constitutional protection based on personhood.  They seek to explain the tension in the 
8 Juliet Stumpf 9-Mar-04
Who is entitled to constitutional guarantees is not obvious from the 
text of the Constitution.58 Although the Constitution begins with the phrase 
“We the People,” it does not define who those “people” are.59  Few provisions 
of the Constitution specify that they apply to citizens only.60 Most provisions, 
particularly the Bill of Rights, either address “the people” or “persons”61 or 
couch their application in more general terms.62 The acquisition of citizenship 
appears once in the body of the Constitution, empowering Congress to enact 
“an uniform Rule of Naturalization.”63
Social contract theory, also called membership theory,64 has attempted 
to answer the question of who “the People” are.  The social 
contract/membership approach begins with the premise that “members of the 
citizenry have agreed to be governed in a particular manner.”65 McCulloch v. 
Maryland took this approach in its description of the constitutional bargain 
struck between the people and their government: “The government proceeds 
directly from the people . . . . Its powers are granted by them, and are to be 
exercised directly on them, and for their benefit.”66  From that contractual 
premise, the membership approach concludes that “[o]nly members and 
Supreme Court’s alienage jurisprudence between extreme deference to the political branches of government under 
the plenary power doctrine and heightened suspicion of invidious governmental action.  See Michael J. Wishnie, 
Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 493, 523 (May 2001) (explaining that membership theory in alienage scholarship is a “tension between ‘plenary 
power’ principles and the imperative of national borders on the one hand, and equality principles at stake in 
government regulation of all persons within its borders on the other”).  See also Michael Scaperlanda, Partial 
Membership: Aliens and the Constitutional Community, 81 IOWA L. REV. 707, 712 (March 1996); Cleveland, supra 
note __, at 19-25 (providing a comprehensive history of membership theory, its connection to social contract theory, 
and the flexibility and indeterminacy of the theories).  
58
 Cleveland, supra note __, at 20-25 (describing various approaches in the nineteenth century to this question);
see also Rogers M. Smith, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 36-37 (1998); 
Gerald L. Neuman, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 5 
(1996).
59
 Neuman, supra note __, at 3-4; see Cleveland, supra note __, at 17-20.
60
 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (granting privileges and immunities to “Citizens of each State”); id. art. I, § 3, 
cl. 3 (requiring citizenship to hold the office of senator); id. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (requiring citizenship to become a 
member of Congress); id. art. II, § 1, cl. 4 (limiting to natural born citizens the office of presidency).  See also 
Cleveland, supra note __, at 18.  The Fourteenth Amendment, which provides for birthright citizenship, did not exist 
when the Supreme Court decided Milligan. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
61
 U.S. CONST. amend. I (protecting “the right of the people peaceably to assemble”); id. amend. II (protecting 
“the right of the people to keep and bear arms”); id.amend. IV (“the right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures”); id. amend. V (“No person shall be held to 
answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,... nor shall any person... be twice put in jeopardy... nor be deprived 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law….”); id. amend. IX (retaining for “the people” rights other 
than those enumerated); id. amend. X (reserving to the states and “the people” those powers not delegated to the 
United States).
62 E.g., id. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial . . . .”); id.amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishment inflicted”).
63 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.  Arguably, Article II also addresses the acquisition of citizenship.  See id. art. II, § 1, cl. 4 
(limiting the presidency to birthright citizens).  See also Saito, Asserting Plenary Power, supra note __, at 436.  
64
 Cleveland, supra note __, at 20-21.
65 Id. at 20; Neuman, supra note __, at 5 (noting that the Constitution’s Preamble “arguably speaks the language 
of social contract”); Alexander M. Bickel, Citizen or Person?  What is not Granted Cannot Be Taken Away, in THE 
MORALITY OF CONSENT 33, 36 (1975). 
66 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 404-05 (1819).  
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beneficiaries of the social contract are able to make claims against the 
government.”67  Conversely, “the government may act outside of the 
contract’s constraints against” non-members.68
This section explores how Ex Parte Milligan’s69 use of 
membership/social contract theory laid the groundwork for the evolution of a 
category of pseudo-citizens without full membership in the citizenry.  The 
Court’s later application of membership theory to Chinese immigrants and 
Native Americans spurred the development of the plenary power doctrine and 
led to the early construction of the pseudo-citizen.  Quirin applied the 
membership test from Milligan and aspects of the plenary power doctrine to 
categorize the petitioner as a pseudo-citizen and exclude him from entitlement 
to the constitutional rights of the criminal process.
A. Ex Parte Milligan: The U.S. Citizen Insider
In Milligan, the Court granted the habeas petition of a citizen of 
Indiana who the military had detained and tried during the Civil War.70
Lamdin P. Milligan was born in Ohio71 and had lived in Indiana for twenty 
years before he was arrested at his home by the officer commanding the 
military district of Indiana.72  Military authorities had raided the offices of 
Milligan’s associate and confiscated “guns, ammunition, and incriminating 
documents.”73
A military commission tried Milligan and several others on charges of 
conspiring against the U.S. government, affording aid and comfort to the 
rebels, inciting insurrection, disloyal practices, and committing violations of 
the laws of war.74  These charges were based on allegations that in 1863 and 
1864 Milligan had aided a secret society known as the Order of American 
Knights or the Sons of Liberty in an attempt to overthrow the U.S. 
67
 Cleveland, supra note __, at 20.  See also J.M. Spectar, To Ban or Not to Ban an American Taliban? 
Revocation of Citizenship & Statelessness in a Statecentric System, 39 CAL. W. L. REV. 263, 271-72 (Spring 2003) 
(describing citizenship theories based on consent); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Theories of Loss of Citizenship, 84 
MICH. L. REV. 1471, 1490 (1986) (describing citizenship as “membership in a state generated by mutual consent of a 
person and the state”); Michael Walzer, WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE AN AMERICAN? ESSAYS ON THE AMERICAN 
EXPERIENCE 82-95 (1996) (describing the citizen as a member of a political community who is entitled to certain 
benefits from the state and who must fulfill “common expectations” pertaining to that membership). 
68
 Cleveland, supra note __, at 20.  See also Peter H. Schuck & Rogers M. Smith, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT 
CONSENT, ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY 23-24 (1985).
69 Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
70 Id. at 121-22.
71
 William Rehnquist, Civil Liberty and the Civil War: The Indianapolis Treason Trials, 72 IND. L.J. 927, 932 
(1997).  According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, Milligan was a lawyer who had become active in Democratic politics.  
Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Milligan, 71 U.S at 6, 122.  Several others active in the Democratic Party were also arrested and charged, 
including Harrison H. Dodd, a leader of the Order of American Knights, Horace Heffren, a Democrat in the Indiana 
legislature, and William Bowles, in his eighties, who was a slave owner and sympathized with the South.  Rehnquist, 
supra note __, at 932.  Dodd escaped to Canada before his military trial could conclude.  Id. at 933.
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government, communicated with the enemy, and conspired to seize munitions 
stored in arsenals, liberate prisoners of war, and resist the draft.75  The military 
commission found him guilty, sentenced him to be hanged, and the President 
approved the War Department’s order for his execution.76
A few months later, Milligan sought habeas corpus in civil court.77
The United States Circuit Court for Indiana empanelled a grand jury pursuant 
to a federal statute that made habeas corpus available to citizens of states “in 
which the administration of the laws in the Federal tribunals was unimpaired”
once a grand jury had convened and adjourned without indictment or 
presentment.78  The grand jury considered Milligan’s case and then dispersed, 
having found no violation of United States laws.79  Milligan’s habeas corpus 
petition thus confronted the Supreme Court with incompatible rulings from the 
civil and military courts.80
The Supreme Court decided, as a threshold matter, that it had 
jurisdiction to determine whether a military commission rather than a criminal 
court was the proper tribunal for Milligan.81  The Supreme Court then held 
that a military commission had no jurisdiction to try a citizen who was not a 
member of the military and who resided in a state loyal to the Constitution 
when the civil courts, created by Congress and empowered to hear criminal 
cases, were open and functioning.82  The Court rejected the government’s 
argument that the Bill of Rights did not apply in wartime.83  It held that the 
military trial had violated the Sixth Amendment’s requirement of a trial before 
an impartial jury and the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that a grand jury 
indictment precede all prosecutions of citizen civilians.84
From one perspective, questions about membership in the national 
community seem to be absent in Milligan.  After the Civil War, the dominant 
vision of federal power was of a federal government limited to the enumerated 
powers in the Constitution.85 Milligan’s holding relied upon two precepts of 
the enumerated powers doctrine: that the national government’s power stems 
solely from the enumerated powers of the Constitution, and that the powers 
granted to the people in the Constitution limit that federal power.86 First, 
Milligan confined the source of the government’s authority to the text of the 
75 Milligan, 71 U.S. at 6-7.
76 Id. at 107-08. 
77 Id.
78 Id. at 108, 116.
79 Id. at 107-08.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 118.
82 Id. at 121.
83
 Rehnquist, supra note __, at 934.
84 Milligan, 71 U.S. at 118-30.
85 See id.at 119; see also McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 405 (declaring “This government is acknowledged by all, to be 
one of enumerated powers.  The principle, that it can exercise only the powers granted to it... is now universally 
admitted.”); Cleveland, supra note __, at 3 (describing the earmarks of the enumerated powers doctrine).
86 Milligan, 71 U.S. at 119; McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 405; U.S. CONST. amend. X.  
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Constitution,87 rejecting arguments that law external to the Constitution such 
as an “unwritten criminal code” or the “laws and usages of war,” could trump 
constitutional provisions.88  Second, the constitutional powers of the states and 
the people prohibited the federal government from suspending civil rights and 
subjecting citizens to military command.89  The founders had “secured in a 
written constitution every right which the people had wrested from power 
during a contest of ages” and neither the President, nor Congress, nor the 
judiciary could disturb those rights.90
In the end, Milligan reveals a deep conflict about who “the People” are 
who wield the constitutional power that constrains the government.  While 
Milligan seems to extend constitutional protections to “all classes of men, at 
all times, and under all circumstances,”91 a closer reading of the opinion 
suggests a more limited membership in the constitutional community.
Throughout the opinion, the Supreme Court invokes citizenship as a central 
source of constitutional rights and characterizes it as a status imbued with 
constitutional guarantees against government action. 92
Milligan’s citizenship is the first piece of information that the Court 
imparts, emphasizing that “Milligan is a citizen of the United States” and “has 
lived for twenty years in Indiana.”93 The opinion frames the “controlling 
question” of the case in terms of citizenship.  Inquiring whether the military 
had jurisdiction to try and sentence Milligan, the opinion begins its response 
by observing that “Milligan, not a resident of one of the rebellious states, but a 
citizen of Indiana for twenty years past, and never in the military or naval 
service, is, while at his home” arrested by the military, imprisoned, convicted, 
and sentenced to be hanged.94
Citizenship defines the rights at play in this case for the Court, evoking 
the constitutional protections of a criminal trial.  In discussing the suspension 
of the writ of habeas corpus, the Court noted that the writ had “never before 
87 Milligan, 71 U.S. at 121-22.  The military commission could not be “justif[ied] on the mandate of the 
President; because he is controlled by law, and has his appropriate sphere of duty, which is to execute, not to make, 
the laws . . . .”  Id. at 121.  Nor could Congress grant such power to a military commission.  Id.
88 Id. at 121.
89 Id. at 124.
90 Id. at 119, 125. 
91 Id. at 120.  The Court emphasized that the principles of the Constitution do not yield even in “troublous times 
… when rulers and people would become restive under restraint, and seek by sharp and decisive measures to 
accomplish ends deemed just and proper ….”  Id. at 120.  This proclamation of the breadth of the Constitution’s 
protections and the universal population to which they extend flows from a vision of the Constitution as the central 
source of law for all people, not just citizens.  
92 E.g., id. at 115 (“[t]he privilege of this great writ had never before been withheld from the citizen”), 119 (“it 
is the birthright of every American citizen when charged with a crime, to be tried and punished according to law”), 
121 (“the ‘laws and usages of war’ . . . can never be applied to citizens in states which have upheld the authority of 
the government, and where the courts are open and their process unobstructed”); see also id. at 121-22, 123, 125, 
126. 
93 Id. at 107. 
94 Id. at 118.
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been withheld from the citizen.”95  The Court stated that “it is the birthright of 
every American citizen when charged with a crime, to be tried and punished 
according to law.”96  That “birthright” entitles the American citizen to the 
protections of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments.97  Other than those 
serving in the military, “citizens of states where the courts are open, if charged 
with crime, are guaranteed the inestimable privilege of trial by jury.”98
Military trials of civilian citizens were impermissible because “a trial by an 
established court, assisted by an impartial jury, was the only sure way of 
protecting the citizen against oppression and wrong.”99
In this way, Milligan addresses the question of what identifies “the 
People” whose powers limit the government’s actions.  The Court’s answer is 
that citizens — at least those who reside in loyal states — belong to the class 
of “people” who may invoke the Constitution’s protections.100  The Court 
positions Milligan the Citizen as an insider, as a member of the constitutional 
community deserving of constitutional protections, despite allegations and 
evidence that he aided the enemy.
Is this emphasis on citizenship merely rhetorical?  The Court’s focus 
on the significance of citizenship to constitutional protections appears to 
motivate the result in this case.  Certain facts — that he is a citizen, has been a 
longstanding resident of Indiana, and has never lived in the rebellious states 
— surface again and again in the opinion.101  This refrain emphasizes 
Milligan’s identity with the community of citizens of Indiana and the United 
States.102  It assumes a significance in the opinion that transcends mere 
rhetorical support for the Court’s holding.  His citizenship is defined less by 
the one-dimensional nature of his formal citizenship status than by the depth 
and quality of his connection to the United States.103  Milligan’s citizenship, 
95 Id. at 115.
96 Id. at 119.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 123.
99 Id. at 126.
100 See Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1575, 1592 (June 2002) (positing 
citizenship as a form of inclusion, in which citizens “imagine fellow members who are to be included in a network of 
kinship or membership”).
101 Id. at 107 (“The case made by the petition is this: Milligan is a citizen of the United States; has lived for 
twenty years in Indiana; and, at the time of the grievances complained of, was not, and never had been in the military 
or naval service of the United States”), 108 (“Milligan insists that said military commission had no jurisdiction to try 
him . . . because he was a citizen of the United States and the State of Indiana, and had not been, since the 
commencement of the late Rebellion, a resident of any of the States whose citizens were arrayed against the 
government”), 118 (“Milligan, not a resident of one of the rebellious states, or a prisoner of war, but a citizen of 
Indiana for twenty years past, and never in the military or naval service, is, while at his home, arrested by the military 
power of the United States”), 131 (“It is not easy to see how he can be treated as a prisoner of war, when he lived in 
Indiana for the past twenty years, was arrested there, and had not been, during the late troubles, a resident of any of 
the states in rebellion”).
102 See Volpp supra, note __ at 1593 (focusing on the role of ideology in “either including one as a citizen or 
excluding one from membership”).
103 See Peter H. Schuck, Citizenship in Federal Systems, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 195, 207-08 (Spring 2000)
(comparing the “legal” dimension of citizenship, which “emphasizes the positive law that creates the distinctive 
status of citizen,” with the “psychological” dimension which measures an individual’s identification with a particular 
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the length of his residence in Indiana, and his connection to that state form a 
sort of “minimum contacts” test104 that measures the strength of the 
connection between the citizen and the citizenry.     
Yet, applying a social contract-membership approach could lead to the 
opposite conclusion from the one the Court reached.  Milligan arguably 
breached the social contract through his alleged conduct.105  In the midst of a 
war over the very survival of the social contract, why not permit a military 
commission to decide whether Milligan remained a party to that contract?  
The answer may lie in Milligan’s dual vision of the social contract that 
underlies the Constitution.  The social contract between the government and 
its people includes, on one level, individual citizens.  On a second level, in 
Milligan, “the people” are composed of the people of the state or the nation as 
a whole.  The Court examines the effect of military jurisdiction on both levels.  
In addition to addressing whether the Constitution endowed Milligan with 
enforceable rights as an individual member of the social contract, the Court 
also focused on the people of Indiana and the United States.  This second view 
of membership hearkens back to the social contract theory in McCulloch v. 
Maryland.106  McCulloch described the bargain as struck primarily between 
the people of their states and the national government, and secondarily 
requiring the “assent of the states” themselves.107  This agreement was entered 
into by delegates “chosen in each state by the people” of that state.108 In this 
view, the people of the states as a whole compose the membership of the 
community that entered into the social contract.
This collective bargain manifests itself in two ways in Milligan. First, 
the opinion characterizes the government’s use of a military commission 
instead of a criminal court as flouting the instruction of the people’s national 
representatives.  Congress had created a statutory process to determine the 
loyalty of citizens like Milligan who had been detained by the military.109  It 
“declared penalties against the offences charged, provided for their 
punishment, and directed [the Circuit Court of Indiana] to hear and determine 
them.”110  In effect, the legislature had defined a protected category of citizens 
who were within the circle of membership.  The military trial evaded these 
instructions.
Second, the opinion turned to the people of Indiana.  The loyalty of the 
state, and with the “sociological dimension” of citizenship which “looks to how individual citizens are integrated into 
civil society”).  
104 See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (establishing a “minimum contacts” test for 
personal jurisdiction).
105
 Milligan was charged with insurrection, conspiring against the government, communicating with and aiding 
the enemy, conspiring to seize weapons and liberate prisoners of war.  Milligan, 71 U.S. at 6-7, 122.
106 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
107 Id. at 403.
108 Id.
109 Milligan, 71 U.S. at 115-16, 122.
110 Id. at 122.
14 Juliet Stumpf 9-Mar-04
state of Indiana and its people marked them as members of the constitutional 
community and affirmed their accord with the constitutional contract.  The 
proceeding in the Indiana Circuit Court “was held in a state, eminently 
distinguished for its patriotism, by judges commissioned during the 
Rebellion.”111  Its people composed the jury, “upright, intelligent, and selected 
by a marshal appointed by the President,” that participated in providing 
Milligan the constitutional right to trial by jury.112 The community of citizens 
of Indiana who composed the grand jury found no criminal violation,113
indicating that they, as a jury of Milligan’s peers, had seen no reason to 
exclude him from their group.  Thus, the use of the military commission 
upstaged and demeaned the authority provided under the Constitution to the 
states and the people.  It violated the bargain embodied in the Constitution 
between “the people” of the state of Indiana and the government they and 
others had created.  
The outcome of the case directly relates to the connection between 
Milligan’s citizenship and the community of citizens of Indiana.  The issue of 
whether the Fifth and Sixth Amendments applied related to his status as a 
member of the citizenry of Indiana.  The Court rejected the application of the 
“laws and usages of war” to citizens “in states which have upheld the authority 
of the government.”114  Milligan’s connection to Indiana permits that state’s 
loyalty to act as a proxy for Milligan’s, nullifying his alleged disloyalty.  As a 
citizen of a loyal state, regardless of his own beliefs or actions, the benefits of 
membership apply to guarantee him a criminal trial.  By affirmatively 
considering the loyalty of the state of Indiana and the value of the participation 
of its people in the criminal process, the Court elevated to constitutional 
magnitude the harm that trial by military commission might do to this second 
level of the social contract.  
On the strength of this social contract analysis, the government’s 
accusations of treason and insurrection did not cause the Court to exclude 
Milligan as an outsider.  He is never characterized as a member of the enemy 
forces.  The anti-governmental actions of which he is accused scarcely make 
an appearance in the opinion, and then only after its central holdings.115  Even 
when the Court suggests that those who conspire against the government in 
wartime are “dangerous enemies,”116 their alleged actions are “crimes” and the 
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 107-08, 122.
114 Id. at 121.
115 Id. at 107, 122 (referring to the accusations merely as “certain charges and specifications”).  Even then, they 
are almost an afterthought, an opportunity for the Court to condemn the alleged conduct without attaching to it any 
significance that would impact the outcome of the case.  The Court stated: “[A]lthough Milligan's trial and conviction 
by a military commission was illegal, yet, if guilty of the crimes imputed to him, and his guilt had been ascertained 
by an established court and impartial jury, he deserved severe punishment.”  Id. at 130 (emphasis in original).
116 Id. at 130 (stating “Open resistance to the measures deemed necessary to subdue a great rebellion . . . 
becomes an enormous crime when it assumes the form of a secret political organization, armed to oppose the laws, 
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“enemies” are subject to criminal law, not a military trial.117
Milligan is usually interpreted as a case about the scope of 
constitutional protections for citizens during wartime.118  Its holding could 
have been limited to the unique context of the Civil War, and the emphasis on 
citizenship explained by the need to promote unity among a divided people 
just after the war ended.  Yet the case takes up more interpretive space than 
that.  It employed the enumerated powers doctrine to constrain the federal 
government and constitutionally empower Milligan and the citizens of 
Indiana.  It enlivened notions of social contract and membership to centralize 
citizenship within the constitutional inquiry.  And it defined the guideposts for 
identifying those citizens that belonged within the membership: indicia of 
association with a state or community considered a party to the social contract, 
and the potential for harm to that community’s stake in the social contract.  
These guideposts find application beyond the Civil War in later cases 
addressing citizens and foreign wars.
B. Plenary Power and the Pseudo-Citizen
Nearly a century passed between Milligan and Ex Parte Quirin, the 
next time the Court confronted the extent of federal power over citizens 
accused as enemy combatants.  During this century, the plenary power 
doctrine emerged through case law that excluded particular groups – primarily 
Native Americans and Asian immigrants – from membership in the 
constitutional community.119  Citizenship, or the lack of it, was a central 
feature of the Court’s move towards expansive federal power and away from a 
national government limited by the constitutional division of power between 
the federal government, the states, and the people.  The Court’s use of 
membership theory in formulating the plenary power doctrine led to the 
construction of a pseudo-citizenship subject to greater federal power and 
fewer constitutional protections.120
This section will first sketch the outlines of the modern plenary power 
doctrine as it appeared in United States v. Curtiss Wright Export Corp.121
and seeks by stealthy means to introduce the enemies of the country into peaceful communities, there to light the 
torch of civil war, and thus overthrow the power of the United States.”) 
117 Id. (“[T]hose concerned in [such conspiracies] are dangerous enemies to their country, and should receive 
the heaviest penalties of law, as an example to deter others from similar criminal conduct.”).
118 See e.g., Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 314 (1946); Rehnquist, supra note __, at 130, 137.
119 See id. at 25-158; Saito, Asserting Plenary Power, supra note __, at 434-43; T. Alexander Aleinikoff, 
SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 11-36 (2002) 
[hereinafter “SEMBLANCES”].  These scholars have also explored a third context: the territories.  See Cleveland, 
supra note __, at 163-250; Saito, Asserting Plenary Power, supra note __, at 443-47, 455-58.  I do not focus on the 
territories in this article.
120
 Criticism of the plenary power doctrine has been legion.  See, e.g., Wishnie, supra note __, at 503 & n.51
(noting “The plenary power doctrine has suffered withering criticism as a shameful and racist relic”) (collecting 
citations).
121 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
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Second, it will examine how membership theory influenced the plenary power 
doctrine’s application to the constitutional rights of non-citizens: immigrants 
seeking to enter or remain in the United States and Native Americans before 
their naturalization by statute.122  Third, it will explore the Court’s decisions 
about whether the plenary power doctrine continued to apply when Native 
Americans and immigrants subsequently became citizens.
1. Curtiss-Wright and the Plenary Power Doctrine
The plenary power doctrine emerged in its modern form in the 
Supreme Court’s 1936 decision in Curtiss-Wright,123 over 60 years after 
Milligan.  The case arose from allegations that the Curtiss-Wright Export 
Corporation sold arms to Bolivia in violation of a presidential proclamation 
that prohibited such sales.124 The Supreme Court upheld the proclamation 
against the challenge that it was an invalid delegation of legislative power to 
the executive.125
Curtiss-Wright articulated three characteristics of the plenary power 
doctrine:126 reliance on a source of federal power that originated outside of the 
text of the Constitution,127 the absence of substantive constitutional limits on 
that power,128 and judicial deference to executive or legislative decisions that 
extend from that power.129  It also took two steps that would later influence 
the treatment of U.S. citizens detained as enemy combatants.  
First, Curtiss-Wright took a great step away from Milligan’s reliance 
on the enumerated powers of the Constitution as the source of federal power 
and a constraint upon that power.  Instead, it confined the enumerated powers 
doctrine to “internal affairs,”130 excluding it from contexts that involve 
sovereignty or nationality.131
122
 Act of May 8, 1906, ch. 2348, § 6, 34 Stat. 182, 183 (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1994)); see also 
Indian General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887 § 6, 24 Stat. 388 (current version at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-334, 339, 341-
342, 348- 349, 354, 381 (1994)).  
123 Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 318-22.
124 Id. at 311.  The proclamation was made pursuant to a joint resolution of Congress. Id.
125 Id. at 333.
126 Id. at 318-22; see Cleveland, supra note __, at 5 (delineating the three characteristics).
127 Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 318-19 (declaring that “the investment of the federal government with the 
powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution” and, consistent with 
international law, the President was the “sole organ of the nation in its external relations”).  Federal authority over 
foreign affairs was inherent in the United States’ status as an independent sovereign. Id.
128 Id. (rejecting claims of constitutional restraint on federal power in the acquisition of territory, expulsion of 
aliens, and the making of international agreements, and declaring that “[n]either the Constitution nor the laws passed 
in pursuance of it have any force in foreign territory”).  
129 Id. at 322 (cautioning that the Court “should not be in haste” to craft judicial rules about federal power in 
foreign relations and warning courts to “hesitate long before limiting or embarrassing” the “sovereignty” and 
“powers of nationality” of the federal government) (quoting Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311 (1915)).
130 Id. at 315-16 (rejecting the “broad statement that the federal government can exercise no powers except 
those specifically enumerated in the Constitution”).
131 See id at 322.  The federal powers to “acquire territory by discovery and occupation,” to “expel undesirable 
aliens” and to make “such international agreements as do not constitute treaties in the constitutional sense” were
“inherently inseparable from the conception of nationality” despite not being “expressly affirmed by the 
9-Mar-04 CITIZENS OF AN ENEMY LAND 17
Second, Curtiss-Wright carefully divorced its holding from U.S. 
citizens.  It declared that “[n]either the Constitution nor the laws passed in 
pursuance of it have any force in foreign territory unless in respect of our own 
citizens.”132  Thus, citizens appeared to remain firmly within constitutional 
boundaries and outside of the reach of the plenary power doctrine.
Although Curtiss-Wright is acclaimed as the first full articulation of 
the plenary power doctrine, its beginnings have been traced to the 19th century, 
shortly after the decision in Milligan.133 Despite Curtiss- Wright’s exempting 
citizens from its holding, the history of the doctrine reveals that citizens who 
were perceived as less than full members of the citizenry could, in fact, be 
subject to the plenary power doctrine.  It is this history that opened the way to 
the doctrine’s application in the current enemy combatant cases.
2. The Early Development of the Plenary Power Doctrine: Non-Citizens
In the early 1800s, prior to Milligan, both Native Americans and 
Chinese immigrants were considered citizens of foreign states, and Congress 
barred them from becoming naturalized U.S. citizens.134  The enumerated 
powers doctrine also limited the federal government’s power over Native 
Americans to the constitutional provisions that expressly addressed them.135
Beginning two decades after Milligan, the Court reversed its reliance on the 
enumerated powers doctrine and invoked membership principles to justify 
expanding federal power over both Native Americans and immigrants.  In 
separate decisions, the Court described both communities as aberrant states, 
existing within but apart from the nation.  
In United States v. Kagama, the Court held that Congress had authority 
to legislate a criminal code for Native Americans.136 The Court based its 
decision in part on a view of Native Americans that excluded them as a 
community from equal membership in the polity.  As dependents of the 
federal government, the tribes were fully within the “exclusive sovereignty” of 
the government:  “The power of the General Government over these remnants 
Constitution.” Id. at 318.
132 Id. (emphasis added).
133 See Cleveland, supra note __, at 25-158; Saito, Asserting Plenary Power, supra note __, at 434-43; 
Aleinikoff, SEMBLANCES, supra note __, at 11-36.
134 See Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 28 (1882), repealed by Act of Dec. 17, 1943, ch. 344, § 1, 57 
Stat. 600 (1943); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 19-20 (1831) (holding that under Article III, the 
Court had no jurisdiction over Native American tribes as “foreign states”); see Naturalization Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 
103 (1790) (limiting naturalization to “free white persons”), repealed by 70A Stat. 644 (1956). See also Saito,
Asserting Plenary Power, supra note __, at 436 (describing legislative and judicial racial restrictions on citizenship 
prior to the Fourteenth Amendment).
135 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559-60 (1832) (holding that the War, Treaty and Indian 
Commerce clauses of the Constitution governed the relationship between Native Americans and the national 
government).  Worcester also rejected the argument that international law provided a source of authority in lieu of the 
Constitution.  Id. at 543-46.   
136 118 U.S. 375, 380 (1886).
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of a race once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to 
their protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom they dwell.”137
Later, the Court would describe the Native Americans as “wards of the 
nation,” “in a state of pupilage,” and as such subject to federal plenary 
authority.138 This child-like relationship with the federal government left no 
room for conceiving of the tribes as equal parties to the constitutional contract.   
Three years after Kagama, in Chae Chan Ping v. United States,139 the 
Court held that Congress had sovereign power to exclude Chinese resident 
aliens from re-entry into the country, despite a treaty with China that had 
guaranteed their reentry.140  Like Kagama, Chae Chan Ping relied heavily on 
membership and social contract theory to deny constitutional protections to 
Chinese residents.  In rebutting the argument that resident aliens were 
“persons” entitled to the panoply of constitutional rights, the Court described 
the Chinese as a race inherently separate from the members of the national 
community, “a Chinese settlement within the state, without any interest in our 
country or its institutions.”141  Instead, “they remained strangers in the land, 
residing apart by themselves, and adhering to the customs and usages of their 
own country. It seemed impossible for them to assimilate with our people, or 
to make any change in their habits or modes of living.”142
This refusal to assimilate constituted a breach of the social contract.  
Because the Chinese “retained the habits and customs of their own 
country,”143 they set themselves apart from “our people,” the primary parties 
to the social contract.  As a result, Chinese immigrants had no claim to the 
constitutional protections that were the benefit of the constitutional bargain.144
137 Id. at 384.
138 Stephens, 174 U.S. at 484.  Plenary power drawn from sovereignty undergirded federal authority to lease 
tribal lands without tribal consent, see Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 307-08 (1902), determine the 
citizenship of tribes, abolish tribal laws and courts, legislate the division of tribal lands, and subject the tribes to the 
jurisdiction of the United States, see Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445, 478, 486-92 (1899) (rejecting Fifth 
Amendment takings challenge).  This power brooked no interference from judicial consideration of individual 
constitutional rights: “Plenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from 
the beginning, and the power has always been deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial 
department of the government.” Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903) (rejecting Fifth Amendment due 
process and takings claims).
139 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
140 Id. at 589.  The Court rejected the plaintiff’s claim that the Constitution did not empower Congress to expel 
permanent residents and that the due process clause protected them from arbitrary expulsion.  Id. at 589-90, 609; 
Cleveland, supra note __, at 124-26 & n.874 (citing Briefs for Appellant by Attorneys Houndly and Carter at 30, 62). 
Instead, it turned to sources of sovereign power outside any specific constitutional provision, locating adequate 
federal authority in international principles governing national territory, and sovereign concerns for self-preservation 
and security.  Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 603-04, 606; see also Saito, Asserting Plenary Power, supra note __, at 
435.  The decision did not address Chae Chan Ping’s constitutional due process arguments.  See Saito, Asserting 
Plenary Power, supra note ___, at 435; Cleveland, supra note __, at 131.
141 Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 595-96.
142 Id. at 595.  
143 Id.
144
 Later decisions relied on membership/social contract theory to expand the notion that powers inherent in 
sovereignty rather than constitutional grants of authority were the source of federal control over Native Americans 
and immigrants.  Upholding immigration statutes excluding individuals deemed likely to become a public charge, the 
Court declared that under international law, “every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and 
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The Court’s decisions hearken back to the second level of the social 
contract from Milligan that looked to whether the group to which the 
individual belonged was part of the “people” of the constitutional community.  
These aberrational communities contrast markedly with Milligan’s staunchly 
loyal and civic-minded state of Indiana.  Unworthy of the constitutional 
contract to which the citizenry of Indiana was a party in Milligan, the Native 
American tribes and Chinese communities were incapable of employing that 
contract to imbue their Native American and immigrant members with 
constitutional protection.
3. The Acquisition of Citizenship and the Plenary Power Doctrine
The beginning of the twentieth century brought two major expansions 
in U.S. citizenship: the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment granting 
citizenship to those born in the United States145 and Congress’s naturalization 
of the Native American tribes.146  The question arose whether this new 
enfranchisement affected the government’s plenary power over the Native 
Americans and children of Chinese residents.  
In United States v. Wong Kim Ark, the Court held that the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s grant of birthright citizenship included the offspring of Chinese 
immigrants.147  The specter that birthright citizenship would confer full 
constitutional rights on this aberrant group and that the government would 
lose its plenary power to exclude them engendered stormy debate among the 
justices.148 In a strident dissent, Chief Justice Fuller and Justice Harlan argued 
that Congress had the power to bar “all persons of a particular race, or their 
children,” from citizenship.149  Nevertheless, the majority held that the plenary 
power of the government to expel Chinese aliens from the country did not 
trump the Fourteenth Amendment’s grant of citizenship to all those born 
essential to self-preservation,” to exclude foreigners. Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892) ; see 
also id. at 660 (rejecting arguments that constitutional due process protected all “persons” within U.S. jurisdiction, 
reasoning that the decisions of the President and Congress constituted sufficient due process of law for entering 
aliens without a claim to membership). The following year, the Court declared that the “right to exclude or to expel 
all aliens,” including permanent residents, was “an inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign and independent 
nation.” Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893). This expansion of inherent federal power over 
immigrants was concentrated in decisions about immigrants who sought to enter or remain in national territory.  E.g., 
Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. 581; Ekiu, 142 U.S. at 659.  Inherent federal power encountered greater judicial resistance 
when applied to aliens within the United States who were not seeking entry or fighting deportation.  E.g., Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886) (striking down San Francisco ordinance that discriminated on the basis of 
alienage as a violation of the Equal Protection clause).
145
 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
146 Act of May 8, 1906, ch. 2348, §  6, 34 Stat. 182, 183 (current version at 25 U.S.C. §  349 (1994)); see also 
Indian General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887 § 6, 24 Stat. 388 (current version at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-334, 339, 341-
342, 348- 349, 354, 381 (1994)).
147 United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 684 (1898).
148 Id. at 705-06, 726 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting) (emphasizing that the majority’s ruling would exempt the native-
born children from the plenary power that permitted the government to deport their parents). 
149 Id. at 732 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
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within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.150
This unity between citizenship and constitutional immunity from 
federal plenary power disintegrated when Native American tribes obtained 
U.S. citizenship.151 In a series of decisions, the Court held that federal plenary 
power over Native Americans was consistent with their acquisition of 
citizenship.152 In Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, despite legislation granting 
citizenship to the Cherokee tribe, the Court denied the Cherokees’ Fifth 
Amendment due process and takings claims.153 Although Congress had 
invested the tribes with citizenship, the Court held that Congress retained 
plenary control over the administration of tribal property and that the judiciary 
must defer to that power.154  The takings question, therefore, was “not one for 
the courts.”155
Here too, the second level of the social contract influenced the Court’s 
decision about whether the Native American citizen could invoke 
constitutional rights.  Unlike the people of the loyal states in Milligan, the 
tribes were “a state, or separate community,”156 apart from the national 
community and unable to imbue their members with the benefits of the social 
contract.  The inability of the tribes as a community to enter into this second 
level of the social contract stemmed from their race.  Conferring citizenship 
did not change the race of the Native Americans, who remained dependent on 
the federal government157 and were not entitled to the “privileges and 
immunities” associated with U.S. citizenship.158 Despite the tribes’ claim to 
citizenship, they were “nevertheless Indians in race, customs, and domestic 
government,” and like other Native American communities, required “special 
consideration and protection”159 by the United States “as a superior and 
150 Id. at 699-701. It rejected the contention that legislation and a treaty with China prohibiting the 
naturalization of Chinese aliens overrode the constitutional provision of birthright citizenship.  Id. at 701-04.  See 
also Cleveland, supra note __, at 155 (characterizing the decision as rejecting the notion that Congress had 
“legislated to make the Chinese a politically subordinated racial caste — an ‘internal colony’ — within the United 
States”) (citing Ronald Takaki, STRANGERS FROM A DIFFERENT SHORE: A HISTORY OF ASIAN AMERICANS 99 (rev. 
ed. 1998)).
151
 Congress increasingly imposed citizenship on the tribes as part of an effort to assimilate them.  Cleveland, 
supra note __, at 74 & n.516 (describing the progression of statutes and treaties that had the effect of dismantling the 
tribes and bestowing citizenship on individual Native Americans).  Native Americans did not obtain citizenship with 
the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 109 (1884).
152 United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 290-91 (1909) (declaring that Congress did not intend, “by the 
mere grant of citizenship, to renounce entirely its jurisdiction over the individual members of this dependent race”); 
United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 48 (1913) (asserting that “citizenship is not in itself an obstacle to the 
exercise by Congress of its power to enact laws for the benefit and protection of tribal Indians”); United States v. 
Nice, 241 U.S. 591, 598 (1916) (stating that “[c]itizenship is not incompatible with tribal existence or continued 
guardianship, and so may be conferred without completely emancipating the Indians, or placing them beyond the 
reach of congressional regulations adopted for their protection.”). 
153 Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 305  (1902).
154 Id. at 307, 308 (reasoning that because congressional power was “political and administrative in its nature, 
the manner of its exercise is a question within the province of the legislative branch to determine”).
155 Id.
156 Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445, 484 (1899).
157 Celestine, 215 U.S. at 290-91.
158 Id; see also Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 48. 
159 Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 39.
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civilized nation.”160
In contrast to the state of Indiana acting as a proxy for Milligan in the 
social contract, the tribes’ exclusion from the social contract acted as a proxy 
for the exclusion of Native American citizens as individuals.  In United States 
v. Sandoval,161 the Court held that the citizenship of tribal members was not 
“an obstacle to the exercise by Congress of its power to enact laws for the 
benefit and protection of tribal Native Americans as a dependent people.”162
Although a few individual Native Americans may have shown themselves 
ready for citizenship,163 the “degraded,” “simple, uninformed, and inferior” 
nature of the tribe as a whole justified Congressional plenary power.164
4. Plenary Power and the Pseudo-Citizen
The result of the immigrant and Native American tribe exclusions was 
the creation of a type of citizenship distinct from that described in Milligan.  
The citizen in Milligan possessed the constitutional clout to limit the federal 
government to its enumerated powers.  In contrast, in the Native American 
and immigrant exclusion cases, lack of citizenship expanded the scope of 
federal plenary power and limited constitutional protections.  Once Native 
Americans were granted citizenship, that status provided no greater footing for 
constitutional rights.  These cases suggest that for communities excluded from 
membership, citizenship was not sufficient to stave off application of the 
plenary power doctrine.
It is tempting to discard these instances as bygone relics of race-based 
thinking, or pigeonhole them as relevant only to the specialized areas of 
immigration and Native American jurisprudence.  These cases, however, 
reflect a thoroughly modern conflict between two theories of citizenship.  The 
first, a “formal or nominal membership in an organized political 
community”165 is exemplified by the Fourteenth Amendment’s grant of 
birthright citizenship to native-born Chinese or the statutory citizenship of the 
Native Americans.  The second is citizenship as identity or solidarity with a 
160 Id. at 46; see also Cleveland, supra note __, at 75.  
161
 231 U.S. 28 (1913). 
162 Id. at 48.
163 Id. at 41 (quoting a report from the federal superintendent in Albuquerque: “While a few of these Pueblo 
Indians are ready for citizenship . . . a large per cent of them are unable, and not yet enough advanced along the lines 
of civilization, to take upon themselves the burden of citizenship.”).
164 Id. at 39, 45; see also id. at 46 (stating “in respect of distinctly Indian communities the questions whether, to 
what extent, and for what time they shall be recognized and dealt with as dependent tribes requiring the guardianship 
and protection of the United States are to be determined by Congress, and not by the courts.” (quoting Tiger v. 
Western Invest. Co., 221 U.S. 286, 315 (1911)).
165
 Bosniak, Citizenship, supra note __, at 455; see also Spectar, supra note __, at 271-72 (applying citizenship 
theory to the political and legal context of the capture and trial of John Walker Lindh).  See also Kim Rubenstein & 
Daniel Adler, International Citizenship; The Future of Nationality in a Globalized World, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL 
STUD. 519, 522 (2000).
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nation and its members.166 Formal citizenship status highlights equality 
among citizens and distinctions between citizens and non-citizens.167
Solidarity with a nation implies patriotism, evoking loyalty to country and 
compatriots.168
Under these two models of citizenship, Milligan can be seen as a case 
in which both formal citizenship status (of Milligan) and identity and 
solidarity (of the state of Indiana) led to full citizenship for Milligan.  The 
Native American cases, in contrast, are the result of a divergence between the 
formal legal citizenship status of the individual Native American and the 
tribes’ lack of identity and solidarity with the nation and its members.  As a 
result, Milligan’s full citizenship entitled him to constitutional rights against 
excessive federal power, while Native Americans became pseudo-citizens, 
entitled to a lesser set of rights and subject to greater plenary power.169
The Court’s decisions about immigrants and Native Americans laid the 
groundwork for the full articulation of the plenary power doctrine in Curtiss-
Wright, as Sarah Cleveland has described.170 Curtiss-Wright explicitly relied 
on the immigrant exclusion cases to bolster inherent federal power.171 While 
Curtiss-Wright suggested that U.S. citizenship was a dividing line between the 
use of the plenary power doctrine and the full application of the 
Constitution,172 this suggestion was to be short-lived.  By 1942, Ex Parte 
Quirin173 would employ aspects of the plenary power doctrine during the 
Second World War to sanction the military trial of a captured soldier who 
166
 Bosniak, Citizenship, supra note __, at 480.  It evokes “the quality of belonging – the felt aspects of 
community membership.”  Id. at 479 (citing Derek Heater, CITIZENSHIP: THE CIVIC IDEAL IN WORLD HISTORY, 
POLITICS AND EDUCATION (1990)).  See also William E. Connolly, IDENTITY/DIFFERENCE: DEMOCRATIC 
NEGOTIATIONS OF POLITICAL PARADOX 198 (1991)).  
167 See Scaperlanda, supra note __, at 718.  One either has equal status as a citizen among other citizens, or 
lesser status as an alien.  “When citizenship is understood as formal legal membership in the polity, aliens remain 
outsiders to citizenship: they reside in the host country only at the country's discretion; there are often restrictions 
imposed on their travel; they are denied the right to participate politically at the national level; and they are often 
precluded from naturalizing.”  Bosniak, Citizenship, supra note __ at 461-62.
168
 Bosniak, Citizenship, supra note __, at 480.  Patriotism “takes as given that members of the nation 
experience themselves as part of a collective whole, part of a shared national culture or project.”  Id. at 481.  This 
approach to citizenship has attracted critique as myopically focused on the nation-state as the location of citizenship, 
when individuals often experience stronger feelings of identity and solidarity with social or cultural groups or with 
transnational and transborder groups other than members of the same nation, or with a more global community.  See
id. at 480-85 (arguing that that “at least some politically and socially-based non-state communities— including some 
that have taken form across national boundaries—can serve as sites of citizenship identity and solidarity”); id. at 480 
n. 136 (citing Ernest Gellner, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM (1983)).
169 Id. at 463-64 (describing the enjoyment of rights as “the defining feature of societal membership”).
170 Cleveland, supra note __, at 273-77 (citing Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 318-19, 322).  She notes “The 
decisions in the Indian, alien, and territory cases do much to explain, though not to justify, the inherent powers 
analysis of Curtiss-Wright.”  Id. at 273 (proposing that these cases engendered the turn toward extra-constitutional 
sources of inherent federal power, the absence of limitations on that power from individual constitutional protections, 
and the extreme judicial deference that later appeared in Curtiss-Wright as the three hallmarks of the plenary power 
doctrine).
171 Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 318 (citing Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890); Fong Yue Ting v. 
United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705 (1893)).  
172 Id. at 318 (stating that “[n]either the Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it have any force in 
foreign territory unless in respect of our own citizens”).
173
 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
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claimed U.S. citizenship.
C. Ex Parte Quirin: Breaking Down the Citizen/Alien Divide
Ex Parte Quirin appears to radically depart from Milligan in subjecting 
a U.S. citizen accused of colluding with the enemy to a military tribunal rather 
than the criminal process.174  Scholars have labeled Quirin an unprecedented 
expansion of federal power in its deference to the executive’s military trial of 
a U.S. citizen when the civilian courts were open and available.175  Yet Quirin 
follows the lead of Milligan and the early plenary power cases in focusing on 
the indicia of full citizenship and the quality of the community with which the 
Court associates the citizen seeking habeas corpus.  Quirin and the more 
recent enemy combatant cases reveal an emphatic distancing of the petitioners 
from the community of U.S. citizens, and a relocation of the accused citizens 
to the realm of foreigners.
1. Ex Parte Quirin: the Citizen Outsider
As in Milligan, the issue in Quirin was whether the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments required a jury trial rather than a military trial.176  In Quirin, the 
Court denied writs of habeas corpus to eight soldiers of the German army.177
The soldiers had been delivered by submarine to beaches on Long Island and 
in Florida with instructions to destroy war industries and facilities in the 
United States.178  They were arrested in Chicago and New York City, and tried 
before a military tribunal.179  The eight challenged the jurisdiction of the 
military tribunals to try them when the civil courts were open and 
functioning.180  One, Herbert Haupt, claimed to be a naturalized citizen and 
asserted that, consistent with Milligan, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments 
precluded a military trial.181 The Court declined to inquire into Haupt’s claim 
174 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 40-45. 
175 See Jack Goldsmith & Cass R. Sunstein, Military Tribunals and Legal Culture: What a Difference Sixty 
Years Makes, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 261, 270 (Spring 2002); A. Christopher Bryant & Carl Tobias, Quirin Revisited, 
2003 WIS. L. REV. 309, 361-63 (2003) [hereinafter “Quirin”]; Katyal & Tribe, supra note __, at 1296 (2002); Saito, 
Legality After September 11, supra note __, at 47.  
176 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 40-45.
177 Id. at 48.
178 Id. at 21.  Upon landing in the United States, they removed their uniforms and buried them.  Id. at 21.  It is 
likely that they landed in uniform in order to ensure that, if captured, they would be classified as lawful combatants 
under international conventions.  See Ruth Wedgwood, Al Qaeda, Terrorism, and Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 328, 335 (2002); Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31 (defining an unlawful combatant as one “who without uniform 
comes secretly through the lines for the purpose of waging war by destruction of life or property”).
179 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21.
180 Id. at 18-19, 24.
181 Id. at 20, 24. Although Quirin addresses only Haupt’s claim of citizenship, in fact there was another 
naturalized citizen among the eight whose citizenship the Court never mentions.  See Jonathan Turley, Tribunals and 
Tribulations: The Antithetical Elements of Military Governance in a Madisonian Democracy, 70 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 649, 735 (August 2002) (citing Robert E. Cushman, Ex Parte Quirin et al.--The Nazi Saboteur Case, 28 
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to citizenship,182 reasoning that there was no distinction between alien and 
citizen belligerents.  Since the federal government exercised discretion over 
both, the Court upheld the use of the military commission to try Haupt.183
In contrast to the elevation of citizenship status in Milligan, Quirin
entirely subordinated the role of citizenship in the inquiry about the 
constitutional rights of citizens suspected of being enemy combatants.  The 
opinion accomplished this in three moves, each of which implicates 
membership principles.  First, it aligned the petitioner with outsiders –
Haupt’s German companions.184  In the process it excluded him from 
membership in the U.S. citizenry and from the benefits of the constitutional 
contract.  Second, it aggregated citizens and non-citizens within a single 
category, the “enemy belligerent,”185 permitting the same legal standards to 
apply to all within it.  Third, it applied law governing foreigners and foreign 
nations.  In short, Quirin’s aggregation of citizens and non-citizens within the 
single category of enemy belligerents admits, with one stroke, the application 
to a U.S. citizen of norms created to apply to non-citizens and pseudo-citizens.  
The opinion’s introduction of Haupt aligns him with the non-citizen 
petitioners so strongly that he is indistinguishable from them: 
All the petitioners were born in Germany; all have lived in the United States.  
All returned to Germany between 1933 and 1941.  All except petitioner Haupt 
are admittedly citizens of the German Reich, with which the United States is at 
war.”
186
Like Milligan and the plenary power cases, the Court’s description of 
Haupt burrows beneath the surface of formal citizenship status.  Haupt’s U.S. 
citizenship is submerged within his identification with the seven German 
citizens.  
The Court in Quirin distinguishes Haupt from the archetypal member 
of the citizenry in a way that contrasts with Milligan’s refrain about the 
petitioner’s long-term association with the state of Indiana.  The Court 
highlights the involuntary and inadvertent nature of Haupt’s acquisition of 
citizenship: “Haupt came to this country with his parents when he was five 
CORNELL L.Q. 54, 54 (1942)).  Ernest Peter Burger immigrated to the United States in 1927 and naturalized in 1933.  
He later returned to Germany, where he joined the Nazi Storm Troopers.  See Michal R. Belknap, A Putrid Pedigree: 
The Bush Administration’s Military Tribunals in Historical Perspective, 38 CAL. W.L. REV. 433, 471 n. 287 (2002)
(citing David J. Danelski, The Saboteurs' Case, J. SUP. CT. HIST. SOC'Y 61, 62-63 (1996)). 
182 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 37-38.
183 Id. at 44.  Quirin has been criticized as lacking in precedent, hastily decided, and politically and
circumstantially motivated.  E.g., Bryant & Tobias, Quirin, supra note __, at 361-63; Belknap, supra note __, at 471-
77.  See also Katyal & Tribe, supra note __, at 1291 (suggesting that “Quirin plainly fits the criteria typically offered 
for judicial confinement or reconsideration” because it was “rendered under extreme time pressure, with respect to 
which there are virtually no reliance interests at stake, and where the statute itself has constitutional dimensions 
suggesting that its construction should be guided by relevant developments in constitutional law.”).
184 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 20.
185 Id. at 24.
186 Id. at 20.
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years old; it is contended that he became a citizen of the United States by 
virtue of the naturalization of his parents during his minority and that he has 
not since lost his citizenship.”187  Haupt thus arrived in the United States when 
he was too young to make weighty decisions about nationality, and his 
claimed naturalization was second-hand, trickling down through his parents.  
The Court portrays Haupt as an accidental citizen; one who acquired 
citizenship through no fault of his own, and, for unexplained reasons, never 
lost it.  
At this point, the Court was at a crossroads.  It could have taken up the 
question whether Haupt was a citizen as a formal matter by deciding whether, 
as the government contended, Haupt had “renounced or abandoned his United 
States citizenship” and “elected to maintain German allegiance and 
citizenship.”188  If the Court had found that Haupt was not a citizen, it might 
have avoided altogether considering the role of citizenship in determining an 
accused citizen’s constitutional rights.  
In a brief paragraph, the Court discarded the relevance of Haupt’s
citizenship to whether he could be tried by a military commission in an area of 
the United States where the civil courts were operating.189  It reasoned that 
U.S. citizenship does not relieve citizens “who associate themselves with the 
military arm of the enemy government, and with its aid, guidance and 
direction enter this country bent on hostile acts” from the consequences of a 
violation of the law of war.190  It distinguished Milligan from Haupt on that 
basis because, unlike Haupt, “Milligan, not being a part of or associated with 
the armed forces of the enemy, was a non-belligerent, not subject to the law of 
war….”191
This passage can be read as merely distinguishing Haupt from Milligan 
by labeling Haupt an enemy belligerent and Milligan as a non-belligerent.192
But the distinction does not hold up under scrutiny.  Although the Court 
asserted that the difference between Haupt and Milligan lay in Haupt’s
187 Id. 
188 Id. at 20. The government’s position was based on legislation that permitted the involuntary 
denationalization of a naturalized citizen who returned to his home country or of any citizen who served in the armed 
forces of a foreign state.  See Nationality Act of Mar. 2, 1907, 34 Stat. 1228, ch. 2534, § 2 (establishing a 
presumption that a naturalized citizen who returned to live in the country of origin would forfeit U.S. citizenship); 
Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 401, 54 Stat. 1137, 1169 (providing for loss of citizenship because of service in 
the armed forces of a foreign state, serving as a government employee of a foreign state, or voting in foreign 
elections, among other bases); see also Peter J. Spiro, Questioning Barriers to Naturalization, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 
479, 505 & n. 128-29 (Summer 1999).  Subsequently, the Supreme Court held that expatriation was unconstitutional 
without the consent of the citizen.  Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 261 (1980) (holding expatriation permissible 
only where citizen intended to denaturalize); Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 256 (1967) (declaring unconstitutional 
expatriation for voting in foreign election).  
189 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 37-38; see also Katyal & Tribe, supra note __, at 1296 (noting “the very precedent 
[President Bush] seeks to revitalize, Quirin, explicitly permits military tribunals to be used against American citizens 
who are ‘unlawful belligerents’ within our own borders”).
190 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 37-38 (citing Gates v. Goodloe, 101 U.S. 612, 615, 617, 618 (1879)).
191 Id. at 45.
192 Id. 
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association with the armed forces of the enemy,193 the offenses alleged in both 
cases are difficult to distinguish.  Milligan and his secret society, like the 
saboteurs in Quirin, were accused of aiding the enemy, inciting insurrection, 
disrupting the war effort, and conspiring to send arms and currency to the 
enemy.194  While Milligan was not accused of wearing the uniform of the 
enemy army, the charges against him were, in essence, the same as those in 
Quirin — that he “associated” with the enemy and was “bent on hostile 
acts.”195
Quirin is consistent with Milligan and the immigrant and Native 
American cases because it applied a kind of “minimum contacts” test,196
analyzing certain factors that signal connection with the United States, e.g.,
the citizen’s place of birth, length of residence in the United States, and 
residence (or lack thereof) in enemy territory.  Quirin contrasted Haupt’s 
accidental acquisition of citizenship by echoing Milligan’s recurring emphasis 
on the indicia of full citizenship, describing Milligan as “a citizen twenty years 
resident in Indiana, who had never been a resident of any of the states in 
rebellion.”197  Unlike Milligan, Quirin focused on Haupt’s lack of connection 
to the United States and his alignment with a belligerent foreign nation to 
conclude that no constitutional protections applied.  Justice Stone’s analysis of 
the quality of Haupt’s citizenship resulted in excluding him from the national 
membership in a way that is reminiscent of the resident aliens in the 
immigrant exclusion cases and the pseudo-citizens of the Native American 
cases.  
Quirin also evaluated the second level of the social contract in which 
the state or national community holds a constitutional interest in the rights that 
an accused citizen asserts.  Like Milligan’s focus on the loyalty of the state of 
Indiana and its near-silence about the acts Milligan was accused of, Quirin 
highlighted Haupt’s association with a community: the citizenry of Germany 
and the members of its army.  Using this lens, the Court’s characterization of 
Haupt as indistinguishable from the other Germans allowed the group of 
German soldiers to act as a proxy for his membership in the same way that the 
citizens of Indiana did for Milligan or the tribes did for individual Native 
Americans.  Haupt’s association with the members of the enemy nation 
excluded him from the benefits of the social contract.  
Aligning Haupt so completely with the rest of the German soldiers 
foreclosed any judicial consideration of the interest of another potential party 
to the social contract: the citizenry of the United States.  The opinion does not 
confront the possibility that the military trial of Haupt deprived the people of 
193 Id.
194 Milligan, 71 U.S at 6, 122.
195 Id.
196 See Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316.
197 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45.
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the United States of a constitutionally significant interest in participating in 
the process of determining Haupt’s guilt.
2. The Alien Citizen
Quirin erased the distinction between citizen and non-citizen enemy 
belligerents.  Drawing a parallel between aliens and “citizen enemies,” the 
Court reasoned that since the Fifth and Sixth Amendments permitted military 
trial of “offenders [who] are aliens not members of our Armed Forces, it is 
plain that [the Amendments] present no greater obstacle to the trial in like 
manner of citizen enemies . . . .”198
The Court contrasted this undifferentiated enemy belligerent category 
with members of the loyal community.  It asserted that the drafters of the 
Constitution would not have excepted “members of our own armed forces 
charged with infractions of the Articles of War” from the guarantee of trial by 
jury while extending it to “alien or citizen offenders against the law of war.”199
These “members of our own armed forces” are parties to the social contract 
and embody archetypal members of the national community.200  It would be 
inconsistent to deny constitutional protections to these full members while 
granting them to aliens and pseudo-citizens outside of the constitutional 
contract.    
The Court’s description of Haupt’s citizenship as an inadvertent 
naturalization and the consequent devolution in his status to that of an alien 
without constitutional protections is reminiscent of the way that membership 
principles limited the constitutional rights of immigrants and Native 
Americans under the plenary power doctrine.  Just as the Court drew on 
principles from the immigrant exclusion cases to expand plenary authority 
over Native Americans,201 Quirin drew on a parallel to aliens to minimize the 
role of citizenship in determining whether constitutional protections applied to 
Haupt.  Similarly, the conclusion that Native Americans, though nominally 
citizens, were incapable of membership in the national community mirrors 
Quirin’s portrayal of Haupt’s accidental citizenship and his resulting 
exclusion from full citizenship.  In both contexts, the Court concluded that 
citizenship alone did not bestow constitutional protection against the 
198 Id. at 44.
199 Id.
200
 The armed forces also constitute a category that does not distinguish on the basis of citizenship status.  They 
are composed of both citizens and non-citizens, as the Court points out in its reference to “aliens not members of our 
Armed Forces.”  Quirin, 317 U.S. at 44.  In this light, the Court appears to act as an equalizing force, erasing 
distinctions based on citizenship so that citizen and alien alike, loyal member and disloyal belligerent alike, receive 
equal protection under the Constitution when accused of the same offenses.
201 See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903) (relying on Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) to 
hold that Congress could abrogate treaties with Indians in the same way that it could abrogate treaties with foreign 
nations).
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sovereign power of the government.
3. Membership and Plenary Power
Breaching the divide between citizenship and alienage in Quirin 
coincides with the appearance of central elements of the plenary power 
doctrine.  Quirin embodies a struggle between the enumerated powers doctrine 
that held sway in Milligan and the plenary power doctrine developed in the 
Native American and immigration cases.  The opinion does not rely expressly 
on the plenary power doctrine, and in fact Justice Stone asserts in his opinion 
that the enumerated powers doctrine governs his analysis.202  Yet all three 
hallmarks of the plenary power doctrine ground the decision: reliance on 
inherent federal power derived from sources of law that originate outside of 
the Constitution; diminished constitutional limitations on federal government 
power; and judicial deference to the executive and legislative branches.203
The opinion relies in the main upon the first hallmark of the plenary 
power doctrine: sources of law, particularly international law and pre-
constitutional norms,204 that were considered outside of the enumerated 
powers of the government in Milligan’s time.  The Court elevated 
international law to primary status over constitutional or domestic law as 
precedent to determine Haupt’s rights.205 The Court held that “[c]itizens who 
associate themselves with the military arm of the enemy government, and with 
its aid, guidance and direction enter this country bent on hostile acts are 
enemy belligerents within the meaning of the Hague Convention and the law 
of war.”206 The use of international law at this juncture is significant because, 
in line with the plenary power doctrine, it originates outside of the 
constitutional framework and therefore apart from the social contract.207
202 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25 (stating “Congress and the President, like the courts, possess no power not derived 
from the Constitution”).  Justice Stone also framed the relevant issue in terms of constitutional limits on federal 
power: “We are concerned only with the question whether it is within the constitutional power of the national 
government to place petitioners upon trial before a military commission for the offenses with which they are 
charged.” Id. at 29.
203 See discussion of the elements of the plenary power doctrine, supra, notes __ -- __ and accompanying text.  
See also Cleveland, supra note __, at 5 (describing the characteristics of the plenary power doctrine).
204 Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 318; see Cleveland, supra note __, at 5.
205 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 38.
206 Id. at 37-38.
207 Id. at 29.  The Court concluded that the “laws and usages of war” were within the constitutional boundaries 
of the congressional power: “By the Articles of War, and especially Article 15, Congress has explicitly provided, so 
far as it may constitutionally do so, that military tribunals shall have jurisdiction to try offenders or offenses against 
the law of war in appropriate cases.  Congress, in addition to making rules for the government of our Armed Forces, 
has thus exercised its authority to define and punish offenses against the law of nations by sanctioning, within 
constitutional limitations, the jurisdiction of military commissions.”  Id. at 28 (emphasis added).  This is exactly the 
argument that Milligan rejected as outside of the enumerated powers of the Constitution.  Milligan held that neither 
the “laws or usages of war” nor the laws of nations empowered the legislature or the executive to use a military 
commission to try a citizen who was not a member of the armed forces.  Milligan, 71 U.S. at 121-22 (declaring that 
the laws and usages of war could “never be applied to citizens in states which have upheld the authority of the 
government, and where the courts are open and their process unobstructed . . . Congress could grant no such power”). 
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Quirin turned also to conventions of war formulated for non-citizens 
prior to the Constitution.208  The Court first determined that enemy 
belligerents fell neither within the guarantees of the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments nor within the stated exception for members of the armed 
forces.209 It looked outside the text of the Constitution and outside the realm 
of citizenship to pre-constitutional rules of war that permitted the military trial 
of “alien spies” without a jury.210 Based on those rules, Quirin broadly 
exempted from the Fifth Amendment the military trial, without a jury, of 
enemies for offenses against the law of war.211
The second hallmark of the plenary power doctrine, a diminishing of 
the power of individual constitutional rights,212 is consistent with the Court’s 
conclusion that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments did not apply.  The third 
hallmark of the plenary power doctrine, judicial deference to inherent federal 
power, also emerged in Quirin.213  Although the Court initially claimed broad 
jurisdiction to review executive branch actions affecting individual 
constitutional safeguards,214 it later retreated from this role when it reached the 
question of the scope of the executive’s power.  In an echo of Curtiss-Wright’s
warning that the courts should “hesitate long before limiting or embarrassing 
the executive when wielding the ‘powers of nationality’ or relations with other 
countries,”215 the Court yielded to the discretion of the executive.  It declared 
208 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 33, 41-44.  
209 Id. at 40-43.
210 Id. In construing the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, the Court relied on a statute passed contemporaneously 
with the Amendments that had permitted the military trial of alien spies “according to the law and usage of nations.”  
Id. at 41 (citing § 2 of the Act of Congress of April 10, 1806, 2 Stat. 371).  It was later amended to include citizen 
spies.  34 U.S.C. § 1200; see Quirin, 317 U.S. at 42 n.14 (noting that “in 1862 Congress amended the spy statute to 
include ‘all persons’ instead of only aliens”).  Quirin relied on this later inclusion of citizens as support for erasing 
the citizen/alien distinction, stating, “[u]nder the original statute authorizing trial of alien spies by military tribunals, 
the offenders were outside the constitutional guaranty of trial by jury, not because they were aliens but only because 
they had violated the law of war.”  317 U.S. at 44.
211 Id. at 41-44. The opinion asserts that its conclusion was consistent with “a contemporary construction of 
both Article III, s 2, and the Amendments.” Id. at 41.  This construction of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments was 
contested in the parties’ briefs in Milligan, and rejected as outside the enumerated powers of the Constitution.
Milligan, 71 U.S. at 121-33; see id. at 30 (On the Side of the Petitioner) (“These acts do not confer upon military 
commissions jurisdiction over any persons other than those in the military service and spies”); id. at 99-100 (Reply of 
the United States) (describing the use of military commissions to try and execute spies and traitors during the 
Revolutionary War).  Without expressly addressing the government’s analogy to spies and traitors, Milligan 
concluded that there were no implicit exceptions to the right to trial by jury.  That right “is preserved to every one 
accused of crime who is not attached to the army, or navy, or militia in actual service.” Id. at 123.
212 See Cleveland, supra note __, at 5.
213 Cf. Christopher Bryant & Carl Tobias, Youngstown Revisited, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 373, 379 (Spring 
2002) (asserting that the Court in Quirin exercised “federal judicial authority and resolved challenges to the 
constitutionality of presidential orders on the merits”).  Bryant and Tobias’ analysis is partly in tension with my 
reading of the case.  It is true that the Court agreed to accept jurisdiction; however, its explicit deference to executive 
power raised the bar for the application of individual constitutional rights in a way that is characteristic of judicial 
deference under the plenary power doctrine.
214 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 19.  In setting the stage for the Court’s inquiry, Justice Stone spoke “of the duty which 
rests on the courts, in time of war as well as in time of peace, to preserve unimpaired the constitutional safeguards of 
civil liberty.” Id. at 19.  Neither the President’s attempt to limit judicial review nor the petitioners’ status as “enemy 
aliens” could “foreclose[] consideration by the courts of petitioners’ contentions that the Constitution and laws of the 
United States constitutionally enacted forbid their trial by military commission.” Id. at 25.
215 Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 322.
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that the courts should not interfere with a military detention and trial “ordered 
by the President in the declared exercise of his powers as Commander in Chief 
of the Army in time of war and of grave public danger” without a “clear 
conviction that they are in conflict with the Constitution or laws of Congress 
constitutionally enacted.”216  This “clear conviction” allowed for a greater 
level of judicial review than the abject deference that the plenary power 
doctrine would eventually require.217  Still, it was a far remove from the pro-
active judicial inquiry that Milligan employed under the enumerated powers 
doctrine.218
II. THE RECENT ENEMY COMBATANT CASES
Hamdi and Padilla present a question unexplored by Milligan or 
Quirin: the constitutional legitimacy of indefinite military detention in the 
United States, without trial, of a U.S. citizen alleged to be an enemy 
combatant.219  The two cases confront head-on – for the first time – whether 
the plenary power applies to U.S. citizens in the United States who are 
suspected enemy combatants.  The Fourth Circuit relied on the plenary power 
doctrine to uphold Hamdi’s indefinite detention, deferring to the President’s 
declaration that Hamdi was an enemy combatant.220  In Padilla, the Second 
Circuit held that Padilla’s detention was unconstitutional.221  It rejected the 
government’s argument that under the plenary power doctrine, the President’s 
declaration that Padilla was an enemy combatant justified the detention and 
mandated judicial deference to executive power.222
216 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25.
217
 Wishnie, supra note __, at 503 & n.49 (noting that in the cases establishing the doctrine, “the Supreme Court 
declared that Congress and the Executive Branch possessed a ‘plenary immigration power,’ and that exercises of this 
power largely were immune from judicial oversight”) (citing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 724, 730 
(1893); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 
609 (1889)).
218 Milligan, 71 U.S. at 115, 122.
219 Milligan and Quirin both addressed claims that a criminal rather than a military trial was the proper forum 
for addressing the government’s suspicions.  Id. at 118; Quirin,  317 U.S. at 40-45.
220 Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 474 (holding that “a factual inquiry into the circumstances of Hamdi’s capture would 
be inappropriate” and rejecting “any evaluation of the accuracy of the executive branch’s determination that a person 
is an enemy combatant”).  Hamdi allegedly fought on the side of the Taliban during the United States’ military action 
in Afghanistan.  Id. at 460.  Hamdi was “captured or transferred into the cust ody of the United States” in Afghanistan 
in the fall of 2001 and transported from Afghanistan to Camp X-Ray at the United States Naval Base in Guantanamo 
Bay, Cuba, in January 2002.  Id.  When the authorities there learned of his citizenship, he was transferred to the 
Norfolk Naval Station Brig in Virginia.  Id.
221 Padilla, 352 F.3d at 699.  Padilla is suspected of conspiring with al Queda to build a radiological bomb and 
set it off in the United States.  Id. at 700.  In May 2002, Padilla was arrested in Chicago on a material witness warrant 
related to a grand jury investigation into al Queda’s role in the September 11 attacks.  Id. at 699, 700.  The following 
month, President Bush ordered the Secretary of Defense to take custody of Padilla.  Id. at 700.  
222 Id. at 699.
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A.  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
The Fourth Circuit generated three panel opinions in Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld.  The first (“Hamdi I”)223 held that Hamdi’s father had standing to 
bring a habeas petition on his son’s behalf.224 Hamdi II225 reversed the district 
court’s order granting unmonitored access to counsel.226 Hamdi III227 held 
that Hamdi’s detention was constitutional.228 It is the second and third 
opinions which are of interest here.  In those decisions, the Fourth Circuit 
applied the plenary power doctrine for the first time to a U.S. citizen detained 
as an enemy belligerent.229
1. The Membership Test and the Pseudo-Citizen
Hamdi III’s first holding, that the court had jurisdiction to review 
Hamdi’s habeas petition,230 gathered him into the fold of American citizenship 
and invoked principles of equality among citizens from constitutional 
doctrine.231  It stated that “Hamdi’s petition falls squarely within the Great 
Writ’s purview, since he is an American citizen challenging his summary 
detention for reasons of state necessity.”232  It declared that the Bill of Rights 
“applies to American citizens regardless of race, color, or creed . . .,”233
concluding that “[t]he detention of United States citizens must be subject to 
judicial review.”234
Consistent with Milligan, at this juncture U.S. citizenship appears to 
have an elevating effect on the scope of constitutional protections.  It is the 
presence of American citizenship that invokes the power of the Bill of Rights: 
“Drawing on the Bill of Rights’ historic guarantees, the judiciary plays its 
distinctive role in our constitutional structure when it reviews the detention of 
American citizens by their own government.”235  The Bill of Rights becomes a 
“lens through which we recognize ourselves” as the nation becomes more 
223 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 294 F.3d 598 (4th Cir. 2002) (“Hamdi I”).  
224 Id. at 600 n.1.
225 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2002) (“Hamdi II”).
226 Id. at 279.
227 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2002) (“Hamdi III”), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 981 (2004).
228 Id. at 470-71.
229 Hamdi II, 296 F.3d at 281; Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 465.
230 Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 465.
231
 Scholars have at times defined citizenship as the rights required to attain “full and equal membership.”
Charles Lund Black, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 33-66 (1969) (defining citizenship as 
“the right to be treated fairly when one is the object of action by that government of which one is also a part”).  See 
also Kenneth Karst, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION 1-61, 173-242 (1989) 
(describing “equal citizenship” as a core principle of constitutional thought); Bosniak, Citizenship, supra note __, at 
450 (citing Judith N. Shklar, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 1 (1991)). 
232 Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 465.
233 Id.
234 Id. at 464 (citing Milligan, 71 U.S. at 120).
235 Id.
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diverse – a way of identifying the citizen despite the increased diversity of 
“race, color, or creed.”236  Calling on equal citizenship principles forestalls 
any doubts that Hamdi’s race, color, or religion might be the basis for 
excluding him from the circle of citizenship. 
In tension with this declaration of equal citizenship is the opinion’s 
later application of the membership test which parallels the analysis in Quirin.  
Upon reaching the merits, the Fourth Circuit’s portrayal of Hamdi abruptly 
transforms him from a citizen-insider to a pseudo-citizen with illusory 
citizenship.  The opinion is littered with question marks about Hamdi’s status.  
The court begins the analysis by stating that “Hamdi is apparently an 
American citizen,”237 suggesting a need to look below the surface for a more 
accurate impression.  In its description of Hamdi’s background, the opinion 
more directly questions Hamdi’s claim to citizenship: 
Hamdi apparently was born in Louisiana but left for Saudi Arabia when he 
was a small child. Although initially detained in Afghanistan and then 
Guantanamo Bay, Hamdi was transferred to the Norfolk Naval Station Brig after 
it was discovered that he may not have renounced his American citizenship.238
This characterization of Hamdi’s history divorces him from anything 
but a tenuous connection with the United States.  The statement that Hamdi 
“may not have renounced his American citizenship”239 likely refers, as in 
Quirin, to whether Hamdi’s had given up his U.S. citizenship status.240  It 
suggests that Hamdi’s failure to cast off his citizenship was merely an 
oversight on his part.  It also implies that the accidental retention of his 
citizenship, like a clerical error, might be easily remedied.  
The court’s description distinguishes Hamdi from the archetypal 
citizen described in Milligan.  Milligan’s twenty years living in the loyal state 
of Indiana, his continued presence in a state not hostile to the government, and 
his presence amidst the upstanding citizenry of Indiana contrast sharply with 
Hamdi’s fleeting presence in Louisiana, his residence in a country that the 
United States has invaded, and the accident of birth that resulted in his 
citizenship.  This biographical sketch of Hamdi suggests a much greater 
resemblance to Haupt as the citizen saboteur in Quirin than to Milligan as a 
member of the Indiana community.
The court’s holding — that Hamdi’s detention is constitutional 
because he was captured in an active war zone in a foreign country241 — is
236 Id.
237 Id. at 462 (emphasis added).
238 Id. at 460.
239 Id.  This statement appears in all of the Hamdi opinions.  See Hamdi I, 294 F.3d at 601; Hamdi II, 296 F.3d 
at 280.
240 See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
241 Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 459 (holding that because “it is undisputed that Hamdi was captured in a zone of 
active combat in a foreign theater of conflict,” his detention was constitutional regardless of his current presence 
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consistent with the opinion’s portrayal of Hamdi’s inferior citizenship.  
Hamdi’s alleged presence in an active war zone may well provide support for 
conferring military jurisdiction.  Still, the case “arises out of” his military 
detention inside the United States,242 and he has been in the United States 
throughout the course of judicial review of his petition.
The opinion’s recurring emphasis on Hamdi’s presence on foreign 
ground overrides his presence in the United States, instead drawing 
connections between Hamdi’s citizenship and that foreign territory.  
Whenever Hamdi’s citizenship status appears in the opinion, so too does 
foreign geography.243  From the initial framing of the issue, the opinion 
repeatedly locates Hamdi outside the United States.  Hamdi is “not ‘any 
American citizen alleged to be an enemy combatant’ by the government; he is 
an American citizen captured and detained by American allied forces in a 
foreign theater of war.”244  The court defines “the specific context” of the 
decision with reference to Hamdi’s foreign location: “that of the undisputed 
detention of a citizen during a combat operation undertaken in a foreign 
country and a determination by the executive that the citizen was allied with
enemy forces.”245  The recurring references in Hamdi III to Hamdi’s presence 
in foreign territory246 connect him to that territory despite his citizenship and 
his presence in the United States.
within the United States).
242 Id. at 460.
243 Id. (“Although initially detained in Afghanistan and then Guantanamo Bay, Hamdi was transferred to the 
Norfolk Naval Station Brig after it was discovered that he may not have renounced his American citizenship”; 
“Hamdi is a citizen of the United States who was residing in Afghanistan”; “Although acknowledging that Hamdi 
was seized in Afghanistan …the petition alleges that "as an American citizen, ... Hamdi enjoys the full protections of 
the Constitution’”); id. at 462 (“Yaser Esam Hamdi is apparently an American citizen. He was also captured by 
allied forces in Afghanistan.”), 465 (“the undisputed detention of a citizen during a combat operation undertaken in a 
foreign country”), 471 (“Hamdi's American citizenship has entitled him to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus” 
followed closely by: “Hamdi's petition alleges that he was a resident of and seized in Afghanistan”), 473 (addressing 
“whether, because he is an American citizen currently detained on American soil by the military, Hamdi can be heard  
. . . to rebut the . . . ‘enemy combatant’ designation. We hold that no evidentiary hearing . . . is necessary . . . because 
. . . Hamdi was captured in a zone of active combat operations in a foreign country”), 475 (“One who takes up arms 
against the United States in a foreign theater of war, regardless of his citizenship, may properly be designated an 
enemy combatant”), 476 (“despite his status as an American citizen currently detained on American soil, Hamdi is 
not entitled to challenge the facts . . . . Where . . . a habeas petitioner has been designated an enemy combatant and it 
is undisputed that he was captured in an zone of active combat operations abroad”), 476 (“Hamdi is not "any 
American citizen alleged to be an enemy combatant" by the government; he is an American citizen captured and 
detained by American allied forces in a foreign theater of war”).
244 Id. at 476.
245 Id. at 465.
246 Id. at 459 (“Hamdi was captured in a zone of active combat in a foreign theater of conflict”), 460 (“Although 
initially detained in Afghanistan”; “Hamdi is a citizen of the United States who was residing in Afghanistan when he 
was seized”; “Hamdi was seized in Afghanistan”), 461 (“if Hamdi is indeed an 'enemy combatant' who was captured 
during hostilities in Afghanistan”; “Mobbs … confirms that Hamdi was seized in Afghanistan”, “it is undisputed that 
Hamdi was captured in Afghanistan”), 470 (referring to “a detainee's [Hamdi’s] activities in Afghanistan”), 471 
(“Hamdi's petition alleges that he was a resident of and seized in Afghanistan”), 472, 473 (“it is undisputed that 
Hamdi was captured in a zone of active combat operations in a foreign country”), 475 (“One who takes up arms 
against the United States in a foreign theater of war”; “we reject Hamdi's argument that even if his initial detention in 
Afghanistan was lawful, his continuing detention on American soil is not”), 476 (“he is an American citizen captured 
and detained by American allied forces in a foreign theater of war”). 
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These connections and characterizations are more than just rhetorical 
devices to bolster the court’s holding.  The characterization of Hamdi as 
having no true link to the United States and the questioning of his status as a 
citizen reveal an understanding that despite Hamdi’s citizenship, he is 
essentially an alien.  This depiction of Hamdi opens the way for the 
application of norms traditionally applied to non-citizens, including the 
plenary power doctrine.
2. Plenary Power and the Application of Non-Citizen Norms
Hamdi represents the first time that a court has explicitly applied the 
plenary power doctrine to U.S. citizens detained in the United States under the 
suspicion that they are unlawful enemy combatants.  Citing Curtiss-Wright, 
the Fourth Circuit declared in Hamdi II that “the Supreme Court has shown 
great deference to the political branches when called upon to decide cases 
implicating sensitive matters of foreign policy, national security, or military 
affairs”247 and that the President has “delicate, plenary and exclusive power . . 
. as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international 
relations.”248  The court extended that plenary power to “military designations 
of individuals as enemy combatants in times of active hostilities, as well as to 
their detention after capture on the field of battle.”249  The opinion concludes 
that Hamdi is not entitled to “the safeguards that all Americans have come to 
expect in criminal prosecutions.”250  This open reliance on the plenary power 
doctrine is a significant step from Quirin’s nominal adherence to an 
enumerated power doctrine and its submerged use of the plenary power 
doctrine. 
As in Quirin, the exclusion of the citizen from the social contract and 
the subsequent use of the plenary power doctrine make way for precedent 
governing non-citizens that results in diminished constitutional rights.251  As a 
prelude to the denial of habeas, Hamdi III drew an analogy to the executive’s 
power “to deport or detain alien enemies during the duration of hostilities 
….”
252
  Accompanied by a reference to Ludecke v. Watkins, which addressed 
247 Hamdi II, 296 F.3d at 281 (citing Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319-20).
248 Id. (citing Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320). 
249 Id.  The opinion sought to locate that plenary power in the enumerated powers of the Constitution: “Indeed, 
Articles I and II prominently assign to Congress and the President the shared responsibility for military affairs. See 
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8; art. II, § 2. In accordance with this constitutional text, the Supreme Court has shown great 
deference to the political branches when called upon to decide cases implicating sensitive matters of foreign policy, 
national security, or military affairs.”  Id. at 281.
250 Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 465.  
251 Id. at 463 & n.3 (citing Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946)), 466 
(citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950)), 468 (citing Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 
1978)), 469 (citing Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 789 n.14), 473 (citing Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 793), 474 (citing INS v. 
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001); Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311 (1925); Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 779), 476 (citing 
Ludecke, 335 U.S. at 169). 
252 Id. at 463.
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the internment and deportation during World War II of enemy aliens deemed 
dangerous by the Attorney General, 253 it places Hamdi squarely on the non-
citizen side of the citizenship line.  Similarly, the court cited as a source for 
the term “enemy combatant” In re Yamashita,254 which denied the habeas 
petition of a non-citizen.255  Finally, it considered and rejected as insufficiently 
deferential the legal standard governing the detention of criminal aliens 
detained in the United States.256
The Fourth Circuit’s rejection of the legitimacy of Hamdi’s citizenship 
reveals itself in its reliance on these non-citizen cases.  Like Quirin, Hamdi 
places citizens and aliens on the same level and creates a category of pseudo-
citizens to whom standards governing non-citizens apply. 
B.  Padilla v. Rumsfeld
In Padilla, the Second Circuit held that military detention of an
American citizen seized on American soil outside a zone of combat was 
unconstitutional without explicit Congressional approval.257  The majority 
opinion departed from Hamdi’s analysis in three ways.  First, it did not 
evaluate the petitioner’s association with a foreign community to distinguish 
citizens entitled to constitutional protections from pseudo-citizens who are 
not.  Second, it rejected the application of the plenary power doctrine to a 
citizen in Padilla’s circumstances.258  Third, principles and precedent 
governing non-citizens do not drive the majority opinion.  In contrast, the 
dissent reintroduces all of these analytical modes and would hold the detention 
constitutional upon a minimal evidentiary showing.259
253 Id. at 463 & n.3 (citing Ludecke, 335 U.S. at 173).
254 Id. at 463 n.3 (citing Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 7).
255 Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 26 (denying habeas petition of Japanese general and holding that the Executive had 
authority to use a military commission after hostilities had ended and before peace had been declared).
256 Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 473 (holding that “a factual inquiry into the circumstances of Hamdi’s capture would 
be inappropriate” and rejecting “any evaluation of the accuracy of the executive branch’s determination that a person 
is an enemy combatant”); see id. at 474 (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 306 (2001)).  The Fourth Circuit rejected 
Hamdi’s contention based on St. Cyr that at least “some evidence” must support a determination that a citizen was an 
enemy combatant, instead deferring to allegations in the executive branch’s declaration without providing Hamdi an 
opportunity to rebut them.  Id.  By applying a lower standard of evidence to Hamdi than that required to detain 
immigrants without a trial, see St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 306, the opinion erected a hierarchy of membership in which 
citizens accused as enemy combatants inhabit the bottom rung.  At the top are U.S. citizens holding full membership 
in the citizenry who are entitled to the “reasonable doubt” evidentiary standard of a criminal trial.  Below them are 
criminal aliens awaiting deportation who are entitled to review of whether there is “some evidence” to support the 
detention.  Id. at 306.  At the bottom are U.S. citizens alleged to be enemy combatants, entitled to no review at all.  
257 Padilla, 352 F.3d at 699.  The district court had held that the detention was constitutional once the federal 
government produced “some evidence” that Padilla was an unlawful enemy combatant.  Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 256 F. 
Supp. 2d 564, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (applying the “some evidence” standard drawn from cases establishing the 
constitutional rights of detained aliens).  
258 Padilla, 352 F.3d at 711-18.  
259 Id. at 730 (Wesley, J., dissenting).
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1. Padilla and the Prototypical Citizen
In contrast to Hamdi, the Second Circuit’s characterization of Padilla 
emphatically affirmed his citizenship.  Padilla’s first appearance in the opinion 
emphasizes his nationality and his presence in the United States: “On May 8, 
2002, Jose Padilla, an American citizen, flew on his American passport from 
Pakistan, via Switzerland, to Chicago’s O’Hare International Airport.”260  The 
repetitive invocation of the term “American,” the evidence of his citizenship 
in his passport, and the ease with which he entered the United States highlight 
the strength of Padilla’s connection with the U.S. citizenry.  The link between 
Padilla’s citizenship and the United States is most clear in the opinion’s 
characterization of Padilla as the archetypal “American citizen” on “American 
soil.”261  The majority repeatedly draws connections between Padilla, his 
citizenship and his physical presence in the United States that contrast with the 
Fourth Circuit’s identification of Hamdi with foreign territory.262
Absent from Padilla is the kind of analysis of Padilla’s connection to 
the United States or to an aberrant or enemy group that appeared in Hamdi, 
Quirin, and the immigrant and Native American plenary power cases.  Based 
on Padilla’s formal citizenship status alone, the majority includes him as a 
member of the citizenry “entitled to the constitutional protections extended to 
other citizens.”263  It rejects the government’s attempt to apply the 
membership test in Quirin, stating that it is “not persuaded” by the 
government’s assertion of “factual parallels between the Quirin saboteurs and 
Padilla.”264
The majority’s depiction of Padilla as the prototypical citizen stands in 
stark contrast to the dissent’s exclusion of him from the citizenry.  Judge 
Wesley’s “U.S. citizens” require executive protection from “acts of 
belligerency on U.S. soil that would cause [them] harm”265 rather than 
constitutional protection against executive power.  Padilla is not a member of 
260 Id. at 699.
261 Id.
262 Id at 698 (“Jose Padilla, an American citizen held by military authorities as an enemy combatant”; “an 
American citizen seized on American soil”), 699 (“American citizens on American soil”), 702 (“Does the President 
have the authority to designate as an enemy combatant an American citizen captured within the United States . . .?), 
711 (“our review is limited to the case of an American citizen arrested in the United States”), 712 (“we find that the 
President lacks inherent constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief to detain American citizens on American 
soil outside a zone of combat”, “the Joint Resolution does not authorize the President to detain American citizens 
seized on American soil”), 713 (“whether the Constitution gives the President the power to detain an American 
citizen seized in this country”), 721 (“the President, acting alone, possesses no inherent constitutional authority to 
detain American citizens seized within the United States, away from a zone of combat”) 721 n.29 (holding that the 
President's Commander-in-Chief powers are not plenary “in the context of a domestic seizure of an American 
citizen”), 722 (“the authority to use military force” does not include “the authority to detain American citizens seized 
on American soil”), 723 (“The plain language of the Joint Resolution contains nothing authorizing the detention of 
American citizens captured on United States soil”), 724 (“the President's inherent constitutional powers do not extend 
to the detention . . . of an American citizen seized within the country away from a zone of combat”).
263 Id. at 724.
264 Id. at 716 n.26.
265 Id. at 727 (Wesley, J., dissenting).
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the citizenry; rather, he is the impending harm.  He is “a terrorist citizen 
dangerously close to a violent or destructive act on U.S. soil,”266 a “U.S. 
citizen who is alleged to have ties to the belligerent and who is part of a plan 
for belligerency on U.S. soil,”267 and, in an evocative transformation from 
person to object, “a loaded weapon of al Qaeda.”268
The majority opinion in Padilla applies the second level of the social 
contract in much the way that Milligan did.  As in Milligan, the collective 
constitutional interests of national and state communities play a part in the 
decision.269  The opinion’s reasoning that the Constitution requires explicit 
congressional action for Padilla’s military detention parallels Milligan’s 
concern that a military trial would bypass the collective voice of the nation: 
Congress had “declared penalties against the offences charged, provided for 
their punishment, and directed [the civil courts] to hear and determine 
them.”270
Moreover, as in Milligan, the executive’s imposition of military 
control in Padilla usurped a civilian grand jury’s constitutional role.  The 
court describes Padilla’s arrest “in connection with a grand jury investigation 
of the terrorist attacks of September 11” and describes the executive’s 
interruption of those proceedings.271  Reminiscent of Milligan’s reluctance to 
undercut the competence of the Indiana grand jury, the Second Circuit twice 
invokes the grand jury as a constitutional route for proceedings regarding 
Padilla.272
2. Plenary Power and Law Governing Non-Citizens
Having constructed an image of Padilla as a member of the American 
citizenry in the United States, the majority rejects the government’s claim that 
266 Id. at 728.
267 Id. at 732.
268 Id. at 730.  Judge Wesley would have affirmed the district court’s opinion.  Id. at 726.  As in Quirin, Hamdi, 
and the nineteenth century plenary power cases, the district court applied the plenary power doctrine after a fact-
based test for membership in the citizenry.  Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 571-74.  Judge Mukasey depicted Padilla as 
sharply breaking with the law-abiding citizens of the United States and turning instead to a foreign and hostile 
community.  Id.  Padilla rejected the laws of his birthplace by committing murder as a teenager, changed his name to 
one distinctly Middle Eastern, changed his residence to Egypt, and traveled to Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan where 
he allegedly met with al Queda.  Id. at 572.  This description of Padilla is sandwiched between a description of the 
September 11 attacks, the government’s allegations that Padilla associated with al Queda, and a description of the 
1998 al Queda bombings of United States embassies.  Id. at 570-75.
269 Id. at 699.  
270 Id.; see also Milligan, 71 U.S. at 122.  Padilla steers clear of holding that congressional authorization would 
render the detention constitutional:  “Nor do we express any opinion as to the hypothetical situation of a 
congressionally authorized detention of an American citizen.”  Padilla, 352 F.3d at 699.
271 Padilla, 352 F.3d at 699. 
272 Id. (ordering Padilla’s release from military custody and suggesting that Padilla could be “transferred to the 
appropriate civilian authorities who can bring criminal charges against him. If appropriate, he can also be held as a 
material witness in connection with grand jury proceedings.”); id. at 711 (stating “he arrived in New York as a 
material witness in a grand jury investigation related to the September 11 attacks and departed an enemy 
combatant”).  
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detaining Padilla is within the President’s plenary power.273  It confines the 
plenary power doctrine to cases involving “external affairs” and characterizes 
this case as one involving “internal affairs” over which the President cannot 
exercise unilateral power.274
Unlike the Fourth Circuit’s analogies to alien enemies and its 
consideration of standards governing the detention of criminal aliens,275
Padilla does not rely upon principles governing non-citizens.  This, too, is in 
tension with the dissent.  Judge Wesley’s dissent argues for a hearing to 
determine whether there was sufficient evidence to support Padilla’s military 
detention, using the standard from Zadvydas v. Davis276 which required “some 
evidence” to justify indefinite detention of deportable aliens.277
Hamdi and Padilla present different factual contexts, involving 
different conduct, different geographical boundaries and different allegations 
of involvement with forces opposing the United States.  The paramount 
significance of membership principles, however, is common to both.  The 
Padilla majority’s inclusion of Padilla within the realm of the citizenry, and 
the Fourth Circuit’s exclusion of Hamdi from that realm, indicate the powerful 
role that social contract and membership principles play in defining 
constitutional rights.  Hamdi’s application of the Quirin test for citizenship, 
and Padilla’s eschewal of that test, lead to completely different outcomes.
III. CONCLUSION: THE IMPLICATIONS OF PSEUDO-CITIZENSHIP
AND THE APPLICATION OF LAW GOVERNING NON-CITIZENS
The debate surrounding the enemy combatant cases tends to polarize 
around the proper balance that decisionmakers should strike between national 
security and individual liberty.  Many courts and scholars have argued that the 
executive and legislative branches need flexibility to act quickly to curtail a 
threat to the nation when an individual is suspected of having acted against the 
interests of the nation.278 Others have argued that the criminal process is 
sufficient to protect us against the actions of citizens who are unlawful 
273 Id. at 713-14 (noting the government’s claim that the President had “inherent executive authority” to detain 
Padilla) (citing Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319, 320).
274 Id. at 721 & n.29.
275 Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 463- 76; see supra notes __ and accompanying text. 
276 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 691-97 (2001).  
277 Padilla, 352 F.3d at 733 (Wesley, J., dissenting).
278 See, e.g., George C. Harris, Terrorism and the Constitution: Sacrificing Civil Liberties in the Name of 
National Security, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 135, 147-49 (Spring 2003); William Rehnquist, Civil Liberty and the Civil 
War: The Indianapolis Treason Trials, 72 IND. L.J. 927, 932 (1997); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, 
Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During 
Wartime, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1, 1-2, 9, 15-20 (January 2004); Carl Tobias, Detentions, Military 
Commissions, Terrorism, And Domestic Case Precedent, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1371 (Sept. 2003); David Cole, Their 
Liberties, Our Security: Democracy and Double Standards, 31 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 290, 291 (Summer 2003). See 
also Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25, 37-38; Hamdi II, 296 F.3d at 281; Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319-20); Padilla, 233 F. 
Supp.2d at 587-96.
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combatants.279  This debate is dangerously anemic without an assessment of 
the consequences to citizens and citizenship of a membership test that creates 
different levels of constitutional protection.  Is there a benefit to isolating a 
class of citizens whose claim to full citizenship is perceived as questionable?  
Are there implications for the citizenry as a whole when rules traditionally 
applied to aliens apply to citizens?  Are there implications for non-citizens?  
A. The Supreme Court: Predictions and Implications
First among these questions is what the impact of the membership test 
might be on the Supreme Court’s forthcoming decisions in Hamdi and 
Padilla.  These cases may lead the Supreme Court to confront for the first time 
whether the plenary power doctrine applies to U.S. citizens in the United 
States suspected to be unlawful combatants.  The Court will almost certainly 
confront, implicitly or explicitly, the divergent approaches in the two cases to 
using membership theory to decide the scope of constitutional protections
against federal plenary power.  
Applying a membership test may lead the Supreme Court to affirm 
both cases.  If the Court were to follow Quirin in applying membership 
criteria, it would likely conclude that Hamdi lacks sufficient association with a 
U.S. community.  His ties to Louisiana, where he was born, are weak because 
he left there when he was a small child.280  His connection to other countries is 
likely to be seen as stronger: he allegedly lived in Saudi Arabia and 
Afghanistan after leaving the United States and was detained outside of this 
country.281
Padilla presents a more difficult case.  On the surface, his connection 
with the United States seems stronger.  He was born in Brooklyn, New York, 
grew up in New York City and Chicago, lived in Florida, and has family in the 
United States.282  Like Milligan, he has resided for a significant time in the 
United States, did not reside in enemy territory, was arrested here, and on the 
279 E.g., Michael Greenberger, Is Criminal Justice a Casualty of the Bush Administration's "War on Terror"?, 
31 HUM. RTS. 19, 21 (Winter 2004); see Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note __ at 31 (detailing the argument that no 
person is subject to detention without a criminal trial).  If criminal conviction is a marker of success, then providing 
the constitutional protections of a criminal trial to John Walker Lindh and Timothy McVeigh supports this view. See 
United States v. Lindh, 227 F. Supp. 2d 565, 565, 567 (E.D. Va. 2002); United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166 
(10th Cir. 1998). Lindh was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment because, like Hamdi, he allegedly fought for the 
Taliban against forces allied with the United States. Id; see also United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 548-52, 
564-68 (E.D.Va. 2002) (denying Lindh’s motions to dismiss on several constitutional grounds, including challenges 
under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments). Nor did the criminal process fail in the case of Timothy 
McVeigh’s bombing of an Oklahoma City federal building. McVeigh, 153 F.3d at 1176.  Perhaps of greater concern 
would have been a decision to classify the initial suspects as pseudo-citizens and subject them to a military tribunal: 
Arab-Americans who were initially detained after the Oklahoma City bombing. See Kevin R. Johnson, The Case 
Against Race Profiling In Immigration Enforcement, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 675, 727 (Fall 2000).
280 Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 464.
281 Id.
282 Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 572. See also Guerrero et al., supra note __; Serrano, supra note __.
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surface had strong ties to people and places in this country.283
Yet there is a competing set of facts that could lead to a different 
conclusion about the quality of Padilla’s citizenship.  In 1998, Padilla 
allegedly left Florida to live in Egypt, changed his name to Abdullah al 
Muhajir, and converted from Roman Catholicism to Islam at some point along 
the way.284  One conclusion that the membership test may suggest is that he 
re-shaped his identity in a way that distanced him from the United States and 
from his own citizenship.  
Considering the two cases together, it is unlikely that the Court will 
view the two petitioners as foreigners in the way that the Fourth Circuit did 
Hamdi, nor as the archetypal citizens that Padilla represented in the Second 
Circuit’s majority opinion.  It is more likely that the Court will apply some 
version of the membership criteria that will result in less than full citizenship
for both.  In that case, I predict that the Court will apply the plenary power 
doctrine but in a way that is less deferential than when the doctrine is applied 
to non-citizens.  It may permit greater judicial review of executive action, but 
allow the use of standards for non-citizens to govern the scope of federal 
power over citizens.      
The critical question, then, is whether the use of a membership test 
does more good than harm.  Does the membership test work?  Do the criteria 
test for the attributes that we seek in citizens of the United States, and does the 
test protect us from citizens who mean to do the country harm?  Courts seem 
to use the membership test to protect the members of the social contract from 
fellow citizens who align themselves with an enemy.  The test, at bottom, 
seems intended to act as a screening device to weed out those who are 
formally citizens but who are more likely than the majority to act in a way that 
is disloyal to the nation.  It is, at its core, a loyalty test.285
Is a loyalty test what we need to adequately protect the nation against 
disloyal individuals with formal citizenship status?286 If we assume that the 
membership test and the pseudo-citizen category provide some measure of 
283 Id.
284 Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 572; see also Serrano, supra note __.
285 Seen this way, the enemy combatant cases represent a struggle for dominance between two different 
dimensions of citizenship: citizenship conceived of as formal legal status versus citizenship as identity or solidarity 
with a nation state. Bosniak, Citizenship, supra note __, at 455; see also Spectar, supra note __, at 271-72 
(describing citizenship theories); see also Rubenstein & Adler, supra note __, at 522. If the formal legal status of the 
citizen is viewed as more important than identity or solidarity in the enemy combatant cases, then constitutional 
benefits will follow as soon as the individual establishes citizenship. Bosniak, Citizenship, supra note __, at 463-64.  
See also Charles L. Black, The Unfinished Business of the Warren Court, 46 WASH. L. REV. 3, 8-10 (1970).
(articulating three critical aspects of rights-based citizenship: “First, citizenship is the right to be heard and counted 
on public affairs, the right to vote on equal terms, to speak, and to hold office when legitimately chosen. . . . Second, 
citizenship means the right to be treated fairly when one is the object of action by that government of which one is 
also a part. . . . Thirdly, citizenship is the broad right to lead a private life.”) If, on the other hand, identity and 
solidarity with the nation-state is paramount, the cases suggest that the citizen’s loyalty must be tested before the 
citizen is entitled to the benefits of societal membership: constitutional rights.
286 See generally, Victor C. Romero, Proxies for Loyalty in Constitutional Immigration Law: Citizenship and 
Race after September 11, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 871 (2003).
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protection to the nation, are there negative consequences that we should be 
concerned about?  Both citizens and non-citizens stand to experience an 
impact from these cases.
B. Citizens
The enemy combatant cases upset three common understandings about 
U.S. citizenship: (1) that citizenship imbues the citizen with constitutional 
rights and privileges that are greater than those granted to non-citizens,287 (2) 
that those rights and privileges apply to all citizens equally,288 and (3) that 
citizenship, once acquired by birth or naturalization, is a virtually permanent 
and stable status.289
A category of pseudo-citizens for whom constitutional protections are 
equal to or lesser than those of non-citizens challenges each of those 
understandings.  Applying to citizens legal principles that were originally 
created to govern non-citizens challenges the first understanding that citizens 
have greater constitutional rights than non-citizens.  Establishing a hierarchy 
in which full citizens are entitled to greater constitutional protections than 
pseudo-citizens challenges the second understanding that constitutional 
benefits apply equally to all citizens.  Redefining citizenship to create a hybrid 
citizen/non-citizen category unsettles citizens’ expectations of the permanency 
and stability of their citizenship status. 
The framework of the membership test seems to ameliorate these 
concerns in part.  Most citizens have sufficient ties to the national community 
so that they would escape the pseudo-citizen category.  However, the use of 
membership criteria in the unlawful combatant cases is not explicit, and its 
contours are vaguely defined.  Courts may apply the membership test one way 
or another to support the result they find attractive.  Citizens may become less 
certain about the level of power that the federal government has, which may 
create uncertainty about who they can associate with and what they can say or 
do.  
Nevertheless, the majority of citizens will not be directly affected by 
the malleability of citizenship categories.  Of greatest concern are citizens on 
the margins of membership, those likely to be perceived as less than full 
citizens.  For them, the use of the plenary power doctrine in the current enemy 
combatant cases raises troubling questions.  The membership test and the 
categorizations that spring from it have their roots in the origins of the plenary 
287 See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976) (stating that “[i]n the exercise of its broad power over 
naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens”).
288 See Black, supra note __, at 33-66; Karst, supra note __, at 173-242; Bosniak, Citizenship, supra note __, at 
450.
289 See Alexander Aleinikoff, Theories of Loss of Citizenship, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1471 (1986); Afroyim v. Rusk, 
387 U.S. 253 (1967); Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252 (1980).
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power doctrine.  There is a danger that the doctrine’s historical use to exclude 
certain groups like the Chinese and Native Americans may find echoes in 
decisions concerning certain groups, like Arabs and Muslims, who are 
currently perceived with suspicion.290
Exacerbating this danger is that the pseudo-citizen category upsets 
established norms about the permanency of citizenship.  Outside of the enemy 
combatant context, it is the citizen, and not the government, who has control 
over her citizenship status.  The pseudo-citizen category and the membership 
test undermine the principle that a citizen cannot lose her citizenship status 
unintentionally.  In Afroyim v. Rusk, the Supreme Court placed the burden on 
the government to prove that the citizen intended to renounce her 
citizenship.291 Afroyim requires the government, in effect, to explicitly alter 
the individual’s formal citizenship status before it may treat the citizen as a 
non-citizen.  Classifying the citizens in Quirin and Hamdi as pseudo-citizens 
allowed the government to apply rules governing non-citizens without bearing 
its burden of altering the individual’s formal citizenship status.  When the 
Fourth Circuit accepted without rebuttal the President’s designation of Hamdi 
290
 Volpp, supra note __, at 1592-99 (describing the creation of the Arab Muslim terrorist citizen as a group 
separate from the American public).  These concerns gain clarity in light of the Japanese internment cases, decided 
contemporaneously with Quirin.  See Thomas W. Joo, Presumed Disloyal: Executive Power, Judicial Deference, and 
the Construction of Race Before and After September 11, 34 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 1, 22-31 (2002); Susan 
Akram & Kevin Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After September 11, 2001: The Targeting of 
Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. OF AM. LAW 295, 337 (2003); Natsu Taylor Saito, Symbolism Under 
Siege: Japanese American Redress and the ‘Racing’ of Arab Americans as ‘Terrorists,’ 8 ASIAN L.J. 1, 8-9 (2001); 
Liam Braber, Korematsu’s Ghost: A Post-September 11th Analysis of Race and National Security, 47 VILL. L. REV
451 (2002); Neil Gotanda, Book Review, “Other Non-Whites” in American Legal History: A Review of Justice at 
War, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1186, 1190-91 (1985) .  The internment cases upheld military orders imposing curfews, 
displacement, and confinement in internment camps on all persons of Japanese ancestry, including U.S. citizens.
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 102 (1943) (upholding curfews); Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115, 
116-17 (1943) (same); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944) (upholding orders to report to 
“assembly centers”). Korematsu employed a membership test based on Korematsu’s association with a group – those 
of Japanese ancestry – who were excluded from membership in the social contract.  It stated, “we cannot reject as 
unfounded the judgment of the military authorities and of Congress that there were disloyal members” of the 
Japanese American population “whose number and strength could not be precisely and quickly ascertained.” Id. at 
218. In effect, the Court substituted the presumptive disloyalty of Japanese-Americans as a group for Korematsu’s 
status as an individual citizen.  
Korematsu did not apply the plenary power doctrine.  See id. at 216 (applying “rigid scrutiny” to the racial 
classification). But some scholars and judges, including Chief Justice Rehnquist, have suggested that similar military 
action could warrant judicial deference to the executive and legislative branches. See Rehnquist, supra note __, at 
222-24 (1998); Earl Warren, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE MILITARY, 37 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 181, 192 (1962); Richard 
A. Posner, THE TRUTH ABOUT OUR LIBERTIES, RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 4, 6 
(Summer 2002); Richard A. Posner, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE 
COURTS 171 (2001) (“powerful norms of legal justice, such as the nondiscrimination principle, can bend to practical 
exigencies, [including] winning a war”).  See also Joo, supra note __, at 24-25 (critiquing the viewpoints of these 
authors). The plenary power doctrine stands ready for such an application.
291 Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 257-68 (1967). Cases in which the government has attempted to revoke an 
individual’s citizenship have raised this same tension between formal citizenship status and citizenship as identity or 
solidarity. See Aleinikoff, supra note __, at 1473-75.  These cases involved conduct by citizens that similarly 
reflected disloyalty to the United States, such as serving in the armed forces of Cuba after the Castro revolution, see 
United States ex rel. Marks v. Esperdy, 315 F.2d 673, 676 (2d Cir. 1963), aff'd sub nom. Marks v. Esperdy, 377 U.S. 
214 (1964), swearing allegiance to another government, Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252 (1980), or voting in a 
foreign election, Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 257-68.
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as an enemy combatant and applied the plenary power doctrine,292 it 
presumed, counter to Afroyim, that Hamdi intended to renounce his citizenship 
and any identification or solidarity with the nation.293
C. Non-Citizens
The impact on non-citizens is more attenuated but no less significant.  
The application to citizens of rules governing non-citizens reaffirms the lower 
level of constitutional protections accorded to non-citizens as well as their 
exclusion from the social contract.294 The greatest concern that these cases 
raise is that the rules being applied to citizens were originally crafted for non-
citizens, without the foresight that they might later cross the citizenship divide.  
David Cole has observed that immigration law acts as a testing ground for 
rules that would be unacceptable to the citizenry at the time.295  In times of 
national stress, those rules come to be applied to citizens as well.296
Thus, the enemy combatant cases suggest that we need to be cautious 
about the rules we craft for non-citizens.  Relying too heavily on a formal 
distinction between citizens and non-citizens will fail to anticipate the effect 
on citizens of rules now being crafted for non-citizens.297 If courts break 
down the division between citizen and non-citizen in ways that lessen 
constitutional protections for both, then we all must be concerned about the 
rules that apply to enemy combatants, whether citizen or alien.
292 Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 466 (.
293 It is telling that the only time in the current unlawful combatant cases that a court has faced the issue of 
denaturalization is in the confined constitutional context of a criminal trial.  In Lindh, the district court 
acknowledged, and directed to Congress, arguments that loss of citizenship might be an appropriate criminal 
punishment for Lindh’s conduct. Lindh, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 573.
294 Critics have questioned the legitimacy of a distinction between constitutional protections for citizens and 
non- citizens, and some have argued instead in favor of according constitutional rights on the basis of personhood.  
See, e.g., David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953 (May 2002), Linda Bosniak, Constitutional Citizenship 
Through the Prism of Alienage, 63 OHIO ST. L. J. 1285 (2002-2003); Linda Kelly, Defying Membership, 67 U. Cin. 
L. Rev. 185 (1998).
295
 Cole, Enemy Aliens, supra note __, at 957.
296 Id. at 959.
297 Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration and We The People After September 11, 66 ALB. L. REV. 413, 422 (2003) 
(“What is really troubling about the government's response to September 11 has not been that the government is 
treating citizens and non-citizens differently.  Rather, it is that current policies treat many citizens as if they were 
non-citizens—at least if we look beyond a narrow, legalistic definition of what it means to be a U.S. citizen”).
